Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-95-039 *28 February 1995*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

ALBANIA

Ministry Spokesman Denies Arms Purchases *[Tirana TV]* 1
Foreign Ministry Protests Border Incidents *[Tirana TV]* 1

CZECH REPUBLIC

Klaus, Horn Confirm Differences Over Joining EU *[Prague Radio]* 2
Discuss Bilateral Cooperation *[Prague Radio]* 2
Havel, Scalfaro Assess Czech-Italian Relations *[Prague Radio]* 2
Klaus Denies Noncooperation Over EU Admission *[DENNI TELEGRAF 23 Feb]* 2

SLOVAKIA

Meciar Allays Fear of Visa-Free Russian Contacts *[SMENA 21 Feb]* 3
Prime Minister Gives 'Friday' Interview *[Bratislava Radio]* 3
Kovac Discusses Privatization, Political Scene *[DENNI TELEGRAF 17 Feb]* 4
Young Slovaks Seek Education, Work Abroad *[PRAGUE POST 1-7 Feb]* 5
Slobodnik Comments on Relations With Czech Media *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 28 Dec]* 6
Goals of Planned Information Agency Revealed *[PRAGUE POST 18-24 Jan]* 6
Cleanup of Bohunice Nuclear Plant in Progress *[PRAGUE POST 17 Jan]* 7

HUNGARY

Kovacs on NATO Membership, Basic Treaties *[Budapest TV]* 9
Privatization Minister-Designate Views Policies *[MAGYAR NEMZET 22 Feb]* 9
Details of Short-Term Austerity Plan Published *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 23 Feb]* 10
Police Spokesman Assesses Reorganization Tasks *[MAGYAR NEMZET 27 Feb]* 11
Justice Ministry Moves To Discipline Judges *[NEPSZABADSAG 9 Jan]* 12

POLAND

Russians Block Trucks Returning From Chechnya *[Warsaw TV]* 14
Walesa Returns to Warsaw, Comments on Situation *[PAP]* 14
Oleksy To Decide on Forming Government Today *[PAP]* 14
Talks With Walesa Very Difficult *[Warsaw Radio]* 15
TV Gives Details of Government *[Warsaw TV]* 15
Kolodko Interviewed on Role in Oleksy's Cabinet *[Warsaw Radio]* 15
Poll Shows Decreasing Support for Pawlak, Cabinet *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 27 Feb]* 16
SdRP Accepts Coalition Agreement with PSL *[PAP]* 17
Senate Speaker Says Walesa May Face Impeachment *[Warsaw TV]* 17
Solidarity Organizes Arms, Aviation Protest *[Warsaw Radio]* 17
Republic Interested in Purchasing F-16 Planes *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 25-26 Feb]* 18

ROMANIA

UDMR Official on Odorheiu Secuiesc Events *[ADEVARUL 11-12 Feb]* 19
'Anti-Romanian' Actions of UDMR Listed *[ROMANIA MARE 3 Feb]* 20
Ceausescu's Birthday Marked at Grave, in Press *[EUROPA 25 Jan-7 Feb, etc.]* 22

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Turkish Ambassador Addresses B-H Assembly *[Sarajevo Radio]* 23
Izetbegovic Assesses Successes, Failures *[BOSNJACKI AVAZ 15 Feb]* 23
Silajdzic: Contact Group Plan Rewards 'Genocide' *[Munich FOCUS 25 Feb]* 25
Delic Says Political Will Needed for Joint Army *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26
Delic Calls For Firmer Stand on UNPROFOR *[Sarajevo Radio]* 26
UN: Missile Radar Locked on German Plane *[AFP]* 28
Document Outlines Aims of Herceg-Bosna *[SRNA]* 28

CROATIA

Tudjman Airs Views on UNPROFOR Issue *[Zagreb TV]* 29
Tudjman Envoy Confirms Policy on UNPROFOR *[NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA 24 Feb]* 29
UN Claims Army 'Stronger' Than Suggested *[AFP]* 32
Russian Envoy Warns Zagreb of Sanctions *[TANJUG]* 32
Krajina 'Will Never Be Part of Croatia' *[SRNA]* 33
Mikelic on Resuming Talks With Zagreb *[TANJUG]* 33
UN's Akashi Refused Request To Meet Demirel *[Ankara TV]* 33

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Xheferri Briefs EU Envoy on Albanian Repression *[Tirana TV]* 34
Albanians Demand Legalization of Banned University *[TANJUG]* 34
University Classes Commence in Private Homes *[Tirana TV]* 34
Albanian Parties Urge Solution to Problems *[TANJUG]* 34
Bankruptcy Proceedings Affect Unemployment Figures *[MIC]* 35

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Contents of Jovanovic Speech to Federal Assembly *[Belgrade TV]* 36
Further From Jovanovic *[Belgrade TV]* 36
Jovnovic: Prevlaka Not Same as Krajina *[Belgrade Radio]* 37
Statistics Show Further Deterioration of Economy *[NASA BORBA 22 Feb]* 38
Kontic, De Lapresle Meet; Sanction Lift Urged *[Belgrade TV]* 38

Serbia

Milosevic Recognition of Croatia, B-H Denied *[TANJUG]* 39

Montenegro

Religious Affairs Minister Meets Islamic Leaders *[TANJUG]* 39

Kosovo

Albanians Fleeing Country Reduced by Half *[Tirana TV]* 40

Ministry Spokesman Denies Arms Purchases

AU2602135895 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A Defense Ministry spokesman declared recently that there has been a full, frontal, denigrating, and malicious attack in the mass media against the Defense Ministry and its chief. Articles translated from Bulgarian newspapers, interpretations, conjectures, and fantastic slanders were included in attacks having to do with the alleged implication of the Defense Ministry, its chief, and even high-level state leaders in the matter of weapons destined for Serbia through Albania's purchase of weapons in Bulgaria.

I am authorized to declare that the Defense Ministry of Albania has never presented to the Bulgarian Defense Ministry any request to purchase armament of any kind. No official at the Defense Ministry has made any request or signed any contract or document of any kind with the Bulgarian Defense Ministry.

Regarding one of the people who is involved to an extent we do not know, we inform that he was dismissed, as enterprise director, back in August 1993. As far as the time period cited in the press is concerned, he does not figure as an enterprise employee then. The Defense Ministry cannot take responsibility for the motives of unauthorized persons. Nevertheless, the Defense Ministry long ago informed the judicial authorities.

The Defense Ministry has officially informed the Bulgarian Defense Ministry about the fact that Albanian state institutions have not been involved in this affair. Meanwhile, the ministry has done everything in its power to assist the Bulgarian side in clarifying the matter.

In conclusion, no one can involve the Defense Ministry and the Albanian state in this affair. The authors of such articles should take responsibility for the misinformation and slander against institutions, and for relying only on the words, conjecture, and fantasies of certain journalists, without getting official confirmation from the ministry. Thus concludes the report of the Defense Ministry spokesman.

Foreign Ministry Protests Border Incidents

AU2802095495 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Press and Information Directorate of the Foreign Ministry reports that Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova today received the Greek ambassador in Tirana, Mr. Khristos Tsalikis. Mr. Starova presented to the Greek ambassador a protest note from the Albanian Foreign Ministry over the latest incidents: the killing of Albanian national Albert Kuka from Burrel, the wounding of Ilir Shima from Rrogozhina, and the maltreatment of another Albanian citizen, Agim Tomorri, a resident of the village of Vlemish in Fier, by the Greek police and military authorities, stressing among other things that such incidents are occurring at a time when both countries are working on the forthcoming visit of Mr. Papoulias, who is to be welcomed to Tirana. Starova demanded that the Greek Government take the necessary measures to put an end to such acts.

The Greek ambassador expressed his regret and that of the Greek Government about the incidents.

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Klaus, Horn Confirm Differences Over Joining EU

LD2702133195 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech and Hungarian prime ministers Vaclav Klaus and Gyula Horn met in Prague today, where they confirmed continuing differences in their perception of the so-called Visegrad Group and its tasks in the process of incorporating Central European countries into the European Union.

They also said they are in favor of improving bilateral relations and discussed issues pertaining to mutual economic cooperation.

Discuss Bilateral Cooperation

LD2702164195 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn has ended his one-day visit to the Czech Republic. Zita Senkova reports on the results of his talks.

[Senkova] [Passage omitted] Personal talks between Vaclav Klaus and Gyula Horn were dominated by issues of bilateral cooperation. Regarding the different attitude of the Czech Republic and Hungary toward the entry of the so-called Visegrad Group countries in the European home, Prime Minister Horn said:

[Begin Horn recording, in Hungarian with superimposed Czech translation] We think that keeping a specific form of cooperation within this institution is a good thing. However, we must not turn the institution into a fetish, and we must not overestimate it.

As for our incorporation into the European Union, we are planning joint consultations. [end recording]

[Senkova] According to Czech Prime Minister Klaus, pointing to the different views held by the Czech Republic and Hungary on the issue of actions taken by the countries of the Visegrad Group amounts to artificially generating problems.

[Begin Klaus recording] Prime Minister Horn uses the expression Visegrad. I do not. I think this represents no fundamental difference in the view that Central European countries, the former communist countries of Central Europe, should live in the conditions of the best possible friendly relations and cooperation. [end recording]

[Senkova] The Hungarian and Czech prime ministers also discussed the ratification of the agreement on the protection of investments, the reduction of farming produce prices, and mutual recognition of certificates in foreign trade.

Havel, Scalfaro Assess Czech-Italian Relations

LD2702151595 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro and Czech President Vaclav Havel have given a very positive assessment of Czech-Italian relations. Klara Stejskalova has more information from the official visit by the Italian head of state.

[Scalfaro, in Italian fading into Czech report] Relations between our two states are excellent; however, we would still like to improve them—in the area of culture, in particular.

As far as cooperation on the European level is concerned, we reaffirmed that not only the political forces but also the population of the two countries are sharing the awareness of belonging together. That is one of the reasons Italy supports the Czech Republic's entry into the European Union as soon as possible, the Italian president said.

When talking about the current, rather tempestuous, domestic political situation in Italy, Havel said he hoped that he would not have to face in the foreseeable future the situation in which Scalfaro found himself recently.

Klaus Denies Noncooperation Over EU Admission

AU2802101995 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 23 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with CR Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vaclav Musilek; place and date not given: "Responsibility Will No Longer Lie With the Civil Servant"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Musilek] Mr. Prime Minister, the Czech Republic [CR] is often criticized for its unwillingness to cooperate closely with the other postcommunist states in the endeavor for admission into the European Union. Do you think that, in view of the different political orientation of our countries, it is possible to find common points of contact on which cooperation could be based?

[Klaus] First of all, I do not think it is true that the Czech Republic would not cooperate with these countries or that it would not want to cooperate with them. This is simply not true, and anyone who is aware of the development of cooperation—for example, in the Central European Free Trade Zone—knows very well that the driving force behind this form of economic cooperation is the Czech Republic and not the other countries in this grouping. The unaddressed, undiscussed, and unanalyzed considerations on what this cooperation should be in the event of admission into the European Union are something else entirely. I do not understand this word [cooperation], but it can only have two variants: either to exchange in a comradely manner certain information from negotiations with EU countries—and I have a feeling that this is taking place on an elementary level—or to have an extensive exchange of views behind the European Union's back on what can be done best and how in order to achieve this or that. I do not think this is in our interest. If someone sees this as a joint attempt to penetrate the doors of the European Union, then it is true that the Czech Republic has rejected this many times; nevertheless, I cannot describe it as a lack of cooperation. I can only describe it as a different view on the efficacy of this or that course of action. [passage omitted]

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Meciar Allays Fear of Visa-Free Russian Contacts

AU2802102095 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 21 Feb 95 pp 1-2

["Exclusive" interview with Vladimir Meciar, HZDS chairman and prime minister, by Roman Slusny; place and date not given: "We Need Not Fear Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Slusny] Mr. Prime Minister, do you really believe that our example of "fraternization with Moscow," as the Czech mass media in particular, have described the 12 agreements between the Slovak Republic and Russia, will be followed by the other countries of the Visegrad Four?

[Meciar] The reaction of Czech newspapers is understandable because we are a great competitor for the Czech Republic, especially with regard to the gas pipeline from Poland. There is a tough battle under way behind the scenes over where it will lead. In reality, the Czechs do not mind what their newspapers write—that is, the conclusion of interstate treaties between the Slovak Republic and Russia. After all, the building of our good relations with the East does not mean loss of partners in the West.

[Slusny] Slovak citizens are justifiedly worried about the opening of our eastern borders. Is the government not afraid of the risks of visa-free contacts with Russia?

[Meciar] This issue is being needlessly dramatized. Until now, the Russians required an invitation to come to Slovakia. But for Russian mafia members it was no problem to get hold of one. The strict border regime damaged chiefly the decent citizens of both countries and, moreover, it had economic disadvantages. Do you remember that 380 Slovak trucks were once stuck at the border because the transport companies did not have Russian entry visas? That also complicated mutual trade. I believe that citizens need not fear visa-free contacts with Russia. We limited visa-free travel to 30 days and we can unilaterally cancel the agreement in the event of marked growth of crime in our country. Moreover, stricter controls will be introduced at the borders to prevent the influx of criminal elements onto our territory.

Prime Minister Gives 'Friday' Interview

LD2402215895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 24 Feb 95

["Regular Friday interview" with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by correspondent Michal Tvarozek; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tvarozek] The 1995 General Agreement was signed on 21 February. However, some trade unions, especially in education, immediately responded by declaring that until their requests are met they will not feel obliged to observe the agreement. It seems that people in the health service are also going to raise objections against the general agreement. The government will most likely have to face strong pressure from the trade unions. How are you going to respond to it in a way which secures the continuation of social peace?

[Meciar] [Passage omitted] It is clear to us that wages do not correspond to the cost of labor. This applies not only to the wages of physicians and teachers, but to the wages of most people in Slovakia. Hence, if we want to tackle this issue we cannot resolve it in a jump. It has to be resolved through a gradual increase of income. [passage omitted]

The government favors a sensible agreement on a gradual increase of wages in all professions within a four-year period. The government is in favor of a preferential treatment for teachers' and physician' wages within this process. However, this has to be based on principles other than the principle of a collectivist all-encompassing solution disregarding performance and social need. [passage omitted]

[Tvarozek] On Tuesday [21 February], both Mrs. Tothova and Mr. Hudec denied that the head of the Slovak Intelligence Service [SIS] would be recalled. Mr. Mitro offered his resignation the very next day, and so did Mr. Cibula. Will Mr. Ivan Lexa become his sucessor? Are any more radical changes expected in the work of this important body?

[Meciar] It is true that the SIS director handed me his resignation request without giving any reasons for it. The fact that the reasons of his resignation were not given leaves this situation open to various interpretations by various parties. This can be abused in different ways. As to who is to become Mitro's successor remains to be seen. The president has decided to recall Mitro from his post as SIS director. I was told by Mitro that some other high-ranking officers, including Mr. Cibula—this is his real name, his code name is different—had also resigned from his post. So had some other officers. I do not think that the SIS has become weaker as a result. On the contrary, I think that the SIS will benefit from this. [passage indistinct]

[Tvarozek] During a visit by Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, an agreement was signed on visa-free travel between the two countries. Let us admit that our public has reacted to this with a certain ill will. It is no secret that a great number of migrants stay to live on our territory.

What countermeasures will the government and the Interior Ministry adopt? Would not this perhaps complicate Slovak-Czech relations if these people attempt to enter the Czech Republic or travel to other countries via the Czech Republic? Are there any objections put forward for instance by the Czech side in the context of this issue?

[Meciar] Since 1990 we have entertained an idea that a big migration move of Russians to the West will take

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place, that several million people will begin moving to reach West Europe. This issue has been looked at by the intelligence services and, after all, in 1990 I went to check the system protecting our eastern border against such an exodus. There is no such danger. [passage indistinct]

The signing of the agreement on visa-free travel offers a chance to both sides to make a positive movement of people possible with the purpose of developing contacts and trade, etc.

It was necessary to take this step if we wanted to make progress. It is possible to perceive this step also in a positive sense of the word, in the sense of what good results it will bring about; and the good prevails.

[Tvarozek] Guyla Horn hinted at the beginning of this week that the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty might be signed as soon as in March. This would certainly contribute toward calming the relations we have with our southern neighbors. In this context, what is your view of a scandal of the so-called bugging of phone calls of the Hungarian coalition? Is it possible to perceive this as an effort to hamper once again the normalization of our relations which has begun to emerge? [passage indistinct]

[Meciar] The fact that a report concerning the bugging has been published is, in my view, aimed at diverting attention. The fact itself has not been proved in any way. I do not want to take a stand on that because the government has not carried out any investigation of the issue.

However, I think that this is just one of a number of propagandist steps through which these parties want to draw attention to themselves at a time when we are literally about to achieve a positive development of Slovak-Hungarian relations. By 21 March the agreements can be signed, and the international community in Europe is sincerely hoping for such an achievement, and they wish us well in this field.

Kovac Discusses Privatization, Political Scene

AU2402154595 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 17 Feb 95 p 5

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Tomas Chalupa and Vit Drbal; place and date not given: "I Was Criticizing Not the Government but Its Practices and Method of Governing"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On 15 February, it was exactly two years since the election of Michal Kovac as the first president of the Slovak Republic. To mark the occasion, President Kovac granted the editorial offices of DENNI TELEGRAF and MLADA FRONTA DNES an exclusive interview on topical domestic and foreign policy issues of concern to the present-day Slovak Republic. [passage omitted]

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Mr. President, the Slovak Republic is ranked at the head of the second group of relatively poorer postcommunist countries. Do you think that this is justified?

[Kovac] According to my information, probably not. The Slovak Republic is, according to the majority of indicators, in second place behind the Czech Republic with regard to economic performance and its standard of living. Admittedly, there are certain differences here in the level of privatization and in the share of the privatized sector in generating the gross domestic product, but the most recent figures point to a 55-percent share in its generation in the privatized and private sectors. In indicators such as the rate of inflation, we are doing better than, for example, Poland and Hungary. In the level of foreign credit indebtedness, we are the same—or even better—than the Czech Republic. Our budget ended in accordance with the objectives we had agreed upon with the International Monetary Fund. I do not know who is measuring and comparing Slovakia's economic performance and standard of living or according to which indicators. I do not think that Slovakia belongs in the aforementioned group of states.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] In your opinion, why was the second wave of coupon privatization in Slovakia, in essence, suspended?

[Kovac] I think that the government has explained this clearly enough. In privatization, the government is giving priority to creating a middle entrepreneurial class, but the main reason was the dual registration of some of those who could take part in the wave. This involved some 70,000 "false" privatization coupon holders. For these reasons, it was necessary to check whether there are duplicitous and false coupon books in circulation. Another reason—I imagine, but the government also maintains this—is that it wants to fill the "package" of enterprises that will be the subject of privatization with quality enterprises. In this context, then, it is criticizing the former government for including unsound enterprises in privatization, which would be to the detriment of the coupon holders.

The current situation is not a suspension of privatization. According to my information, the entire process should get under way by July 1995 at the latest. At the moment, the enterprises already included are being checked; the government wants to remove some enterprises from the second wave and, vice versa, add others. At the end of January 1995, the property of the enterprises in the privatization "package" fulfilling the government's criteria was worth only 50 billion korunas [Sk] and some Sk80 billion-worth of property would be necessary for the regular course of privatization.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Opinions have been expressed in the media recently by representatives from the various coalition parties—first and foremost, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]—that cast doubt on the mandates of the Democratic Union (DU) deputies.

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Prime Minister Meciar and Minister Tothova have, apparently, said that they can imagine that the DU would lose its mandates. On the other hand, the opposition would regard this as an anticonstitutional step, even a coup d'etat. What is your view?

[Kovac] I consider everything that in any way contributes to destabilizing the political situation to be bad. After all, we are all calling for the creation of such conditions that would guarantee a calm environment not only for the government's activity, but also for the activity of the political entities, citizens, businessmen, and other nongovernment organizations or entities. I think it is unfortunate that the question of the validity or invalidity of the election results has come up after the DU deputies have entered parliament. It is rather unusual, because our system has instruments that make it possible to check before an entity enters the elections whether it is entering into them on the basis of the valid laws or not. We know that this happened in the case of the other parties.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] How would you act if, despite this, there was an initiative to withdraw the mandates?

[Kovac] It is necessary to leave this until such a situation arises. I always want to—and will—stand in the position of defending constitutionality and legality in Slovakia. Instances of constantly casting doubt on or of different interpretations of an issue—whether it was or was not in harmony with the law and the constitution—always lead to a certain weakening of the fragile awareness of the need to respect legality. Young democracies should choose a path of boosting legal awareness and respect for the stability of the legal system. Anything else may concern society, because it would be possible to seek whatever in the individual stipulations of the constitution or law whenever. Such a phenomenon does not fit in with the endeavor for stability and the creation of calm conditions for work.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Do you not think that Prime Minister Meciar sometimes has a tendency not to respect the Constitution or laws in his conduct? For example, in connection with the aforementioned case, the prime minister allegedly said that the Constitutional Court is another "unhealthy element on the scene."

[Kovac] I will not answer this question, because I think that what I have already said was sufficient. What the prime minister does, he does with the knowledge that it is necessary to respect the Constitution and the law. It is possible that he has different views or arguments on certain things. Therefore, I do not suppose a priori that the prime minister would want to cast doubt on something capriciously and without reason.

[DENNI TELEGRAF] Right-wing parties are in opposition in most of the Visegrad Group countries. Do you think that, in Slovakia, the voters had an alternative to the HZDS, and do you yourself see another party that would manage to take the country from elections to elections in peace?

[Kovac] The voters make this decision. The Slovak voter had the possibility, as in other countries, to decide in favor of almost two dozen parties or coalitions and to chose the one he trusts. It was up to the individual parties alone whether their leaders and the people on their slates were capable of winning the voter's vote and, in fact, his trust. This means that in Slovakia too, the voter decides according to his level of trust in individual parties and their candidates.

Young Slovaks Seek Education, Work Abroad

95CH0142A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 1-7 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by Timea Spitkova: "Slovakia Is Losing Its Best and Brightest"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Andreja Kuhajdova was one of five students who marched into the Slovak parliament last November and demanded to be heard.

Armed with a petition signed by 3,000 students from across the country, the 22-year-old law student faced the government representatives and appealed to the country's leaders to listen to student demands and respect democratic procedures in parliament.

But Kuhajdova, like the other students, was ignored.

Having made attempts to voice their political and economic concerns through petitions and demonstrations, many students are showing their disapproval with their feet—by leaving the country.

Kuhajdova, who is highly educated and multilingual, typifies a growing number of young people who are fed up with the political situation in Slovakia and feel that bigger and better opportunities await them outside.

"I don't want to leave," Kuhajdova said. "But I am starting to think about it quite often."

Countless numbers of young Slovaks have already packed their bags and left.

"When I realized that Meciar was running for office for the third time, I told myself that if this nation is stupid enough to vote him in for the third time in a row, I will leave," said 25-year-old Michal Fedeles, who put his doctorate work at the Technical University in Kosice aside to study at Central European University in Prague.

Fedeles completed his master's degree in computer engineering, has worked in Germany and the United States, has experience in management and speaks several languages fluently—including English, German and Czech. But he feels that his skills are not desired in Slovakia.

"I would like to do something for Slovakia, but they will have to let me," he said.

According to Fedeles, Slovaks who have worked abroad are often looked upon with suspicion and resentment.

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"When people leave for a Western country to gain knowledge and experience, they may not be professionally accepted when they return," said Fedeles.

The actual number of people who have left Slovakia is difficult to estimate.

Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand are favorite destinations for young Slovaks, who go for vacation, study or work opportunities—and often don't return.

The Czech Republic is the permanent home of many Slovak intellectuals, and if immigration laws permit, the numbers may continue to grow.

Since the breakup of Czechoslovakia, the number of Slovaks who have forfeited their Slovak citizenship in favor of Czech citizenship has exceeded 300,000. However, an agreement between the Czech Republic and Slovakia makes renouncing one's citizenship an unnecessary step. Citizens of one country can work and live in the other without going through the painful bureaucratic hoops necessary for other foreigners.

Prague has become the ultimate destination for many Slovak expatriots, as its low level of unemployment is in striking contrast to the unemployment rate in Slovakia, which hovers around 15 percent.

"The opportunities are much greater in Prague," said Barbora Vavercakova, a Charles University law student who has been recruited to work at a large law firm in Prague. Vavercakova came to the Czech Republic to study after her high school diploma, which was completed in the United States, was rejected by post-secondary schools in Slovakia.

"This—is quite common," said Vavercakova. "I was part of a group of 50 students selected to study in the United States, and none of us were allowed to continue our education in Slovakia."

Slobodnik Comments on Relations With Czech Media

95CH0100C Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 28 Dec 94 p 4

[Interview with Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Slovak parliament, by Oldrich Zabojnik; place and date not given: "Official Czech Policy Toward the Slovak Republic Is Valued"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Slovak parliament stated in his interview with the HOSPODARSKE NOVINY reporter that Slovakia influences also the situation in the Czech Republic.

[Zabojnik] What, in your opinion, is the reason for the a priori negative attitude toward the Slovak Republic?

[Slobodnik] If the world were to learn the truth about us, it would interfere with the plans of those who are intentionally and purposefully creating a murky picture of Slovakia. That is why lies are being repeatedly spread about us. But they will not be able to keep this up forever. Because what is being often told about us to the international public is something different from what the Slovak citizens themselves feel.

[Zabojnik] How do you perceive the attitude of the Czech Republic toward the Slovak Republic in this respect?

[Slobodnik] I would especially like to emphasize what I also used to point out as the minister of culture, which is that we sincerely seek to create and maintain relations as correct as possible with the Czech Republic. In foreign policy, the idea is to coordinate our actions with the Czech Republic where our interests coincide. We also want to make better use of cooperation between the Foreign Relations Committees of both parliaments. Therefore, nothing whatsoever prevents us from proceeding and acting the way I have mentioned.

[Zabojnik] To what extent are you satisfied with the way the Czech media portray the Slovak Republic?

[Slobodnik] We value the official Czech policy for its attitude toward Slovakia. I am sorry, however, that part of the Czech press does not have anything good to say about Slovakia—same as before, when we lived in a common state. Some journalists should perhaps begin to examine their conscience about what it is they have done by spreading false and unfavorable reports about Slovakia. Why did they do it, what did they want to achieve by it? Perhaps to bring Slovakia to its knees. They did not succeed and they will not succeed.

[Zabojnik] How do you see the future of Slovak-Czech relations?

[Slobodnik] As is the case with relations between any two countries, they should be guided by mutual respect and objectivity. Do you think that we would not be able to emphasize some negative aspects of the Czech Republic? I do not even wish to recite what all could be said in that respect. Why should we foster in the Slovak reader negative feelings toward Czech citizens and the Czech Republic? That was never the goal of Slovak policy and political journalism. When this unfavorable and arrogant attitude disappears from the writings of some journalists who obviously would prefer to see us fail, the relations between our republics will continue to deepen in a positive way and we shall cheer each other on. It is as if some Czech journalists, and here and there also politicians, did not understand that a positive development of Slovakia will positively influence the economic, political, and social development in the Czech Republic as well. We want to have positive and better than routine relations with the Czech Republic.

Goals of Planned Information Agency Revealed

95CH0125A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 18-24 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Steven Mihailovich: "Slovak Information Agency To Spread Good News"]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bratislava—Vladimir Meciar's government has told the Foreign Ministry to plan an information agency that will have the task of polishing Slovakia's image abroad.

The decision has raised concerns that the agency will be a mere tool for slanting information in the government's favor, this time on an international scale. The government argues that such an agency is a natural development in a new nation.

"It's not a partisan job, but one for the whole country," said Vladimir Chlebo, director of the Foreign Ministry's press department.

Some observers argue the agency will be used to hide some government policies and actions judged ugly by the West.

"There is a very bad impression of Slovakia abroad," said Juraj Kohutiar, international secretary for the opposition Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). "But it is always when Meciar is in power."

Statistics show that foreign investment dipped dramatically following Meciar's last two election victories. The start of his second tenure as prime minister in 1992 resulted in a drop in foreign investments from Sk1.2 billion to about Sk300 million in the first two months of that term.

The government intends to focus on those countries whose attention it needs. "We are in Europe," said Chlebo, "and Europe is our prime target because of our aim to be a member of the European Union. ...Information about Slovakia is narrow and a bit distorted. This has led to misinterpretation about Slovakia. We want to be correctly understood in our drive for democracy."

Members of the ruling coalition and many Slovak citizens have accused the media, particularly the foreign media, of focusing on the country's negative features.

"The basic idea in the mind of everyone directly involved is that the incorrect view of Slovakia, especially in journalistic circles, must be improved," said Chlebo.

The decision to create an agency was unanimously approved at a late December cabinet meeting. The stated goal is to coordinate efforts now being made by various ministries to distribute information to foreigners.

"It is not just the work of this department in the ministry," said Chlebo. "it will also include knowledgeable people in other ministries and outside the government to get as many ideas as possible. We are also considering possible partnerships with foreign public-relations firms."

The image to be developed will be as divergent and comprehensive as the tools used to achieve it. The agency will utilize television, global computer networks, satellites, audio-visual materials, publications and live presentations to offer a detailed information base on almost every facet of Slovak society, from culture and geography to economics and politics.

"Slovakia, as a newborn country, should fight for its place in the sun," said Chlebo.

Cleanup of Bohunice Nuclear Plant in Progress

95CH0113B Prague PRAGUE POST in English 17 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Maggie Ledford Lawson: "Czechoslovakia's Nuclear Secret Threatens New Havoc"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bohunice—For more than 15 years, the A-1 nuclear plant at Bohunice has been Czechoslovakia's ugly radioactive secret.

After two hushed-up accidents in the 1970s rendered it too contaminated to operate, the plant was quietly shut down in 1979 after only seven years of operation. One post-revolutionary attempt to clean up the plant, which lies an hour's drive northeast of Bratislava, only caused more spillage and further delays.

Now Slovak officials are racing to decontaminate Czechoslovakia's oldest nuclear plant as the danger increases that the facility will release radioactive material into the environment.

Officials admit they haven't solved all the technical problems involved, but say they have no choice but to act quickly.

Tanks and pipes holding radioactive material are corroding and could start leaking at any time, said Ludovit Tibensky, chief of the Slovak Department of Waste and Radioecology. The inside of the reactor hall "looks like an old factory," he said. The former government nuclear power plant analyst said he has visited the plant's reactor hall a number of times since the accidents. Damaged fuel rods are kept in a separate room, and the place is so radioactive that nobody dares go there.

"Our goal is final decontamination by 1997," said Dobroslav Dobak, a spokesman for the Slovak Energy Agency, which is in charge of Bohunice. Costs of the project, which will be financed partly by the government and partly by customers of the utility, could run up to "tens of millions of crowns," he said.

The first major problem at the A-1 plant occurred January 5, 1976, when the heavy-water reactor was shut down for refueling. Because the reactor is under pressure during operation, fuel rods must be clamped down. But someone had forgotten to secure one of the rods.

"It became a missile and was ejected from the core" into the reactor hall, releasing radioactive gas as well as carbon dioxide, said Jozef Blazek, head of nuclear power plant decommissioning at Bohunice. Two workers in a room beneath the reactor hall suffocated from the fumes. Three others who were in the hall itself survived.

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"The release of radioactivity didn't exceed allowable limits," said Dobak, who maintained that the incident had no effect on the environment.

Technicians repaired the damage and restarted the reactor.

A more serious incident occurred on February 22, 1977. When fuel was being inserted into the core, a fuel element that was already inside overheated. The protective covering on the fuel element was damaged, and radioactive water flooded into the plant's cooling system.

"The plant's entire primary circuit was contaminated," Dobak said. "We don't fully understand why the accident happened."

Additional technical problems, including difficulties with steam generators, continued to plague the nuclear plant, leading the regime finally to decide that keeping it open was too risky.

Plant officials contend that the second accident at A-1, like the first, caused no significant release of radiation into the environment.

However, Peter Sabo, an environmentalist who became heavily involved in the issue in the early 1990s when he was a member of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly, thinks differently.

Sabo said he had seen reports of plutonium being found in 1990 in Minivier Channel, a waterway near the nuclear plant.

"The only explanation was that it came from the accident," said Sabo, who is now an environment manager for the Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists, an organization that encourages biodiverse projects.

Even after the government changed hands, A-1 still seemed to be jinxed. Russia agreed to take back fuel rods from the defunct plant, and technicians at Bohunice busied themselves preparing for the transfer of the rods to specially designed lead-lined train cars. The procedure involved removing the fuel rods from a pond where they had been stored to prevent them from overheating and placing them in special travel-ready containers.

However, when technicians tried to drain the radioactive liquid from the fuel rods, some of the rods came apart.

"About 70 liters of the liquid spilled into the reactor hall," said Dobak.

The accident ranked as a No. 3 on the international nuclear rating scale, compared with Chernobyl's worst-case No. 7 ranking, but Miroslav Hrehor, director of administration at the Czech Republic's State Office for Nuclear Safety, said some scientists who dealt with the incident thought the ranking should be higher.

Some 131 fuel assemblies had to be left on the site, said Hrehor.

"The damaged fuel rods have corroded, and now they're very difficult to manipulate," he said.

Following the 1989 revolution, members of the new Czechoslovak government learned, much to their surprise, that they had inherited a "hot" nuclear plant at Bohunice. They weren't alone in being taken aback by what they found.

The communists hadn't shared the story of the A-1 plant with the residents of the hamlet of Bohunice, who live virtually in the shadow of four other reactors that still operate there, or with the citizens of nearby Trnava.

Teams of British, French and German technical experts already have begun preliminary cleanup work at the plant, said Blazek. Radioactive liquid has been removed from the floor of the reactor hall, and "we're working on the walls," he said.

Construction is about to start on an elaborate "center for waste management," where much of the radioactive material will be interred for centuries, he said.

The decontamination plan calls for liquid waste and some solid material to be incinerated at the center, using French technology that has been tested in that country and in Germany, according to Tibensky. The incinerator will be filtered to prevent the release of unacceptable levels of radioactive material into the environment, he said.

Once the waste is reduced to ash, it will be encased in specially designed concrete containers. Some of the material, mostly cesium 137 or cesium 134, "will be stored for 300 years, and then it'll be nonradioactive," he said.

To minimize chances of further accidents, the nuclear cleaning crews are using remote-control devices to decontaminate the problem areas, said Blazek.

Nukem, a German firm, is constructing the incinerator.

Conveniently, "the company is offering a 300-year warranty," said Tibensky.

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Kovacs on NATO Membership, Basic Treaties

LD2602220995 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 95

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by an unidentified announcer during "The Week" program in the studio; date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Our studio guest is Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs. Good evening, Mr. Minister. [passage omitted]

It will become clear from the following clips what kind of difficulties, circumstances, accompany the achievement of Hungary's main foreign political aims. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording of unidentified Russian deputy foreign minister, in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation] It is my firm conviction that Hungary's NATO membership will not imply any kind of political or military threat against Russia. The question of how and how fast this process would take place—of whether this would take place tomorrow, or by the end of a longer period, and what kind of organization NATO would become by that time—is another matter. It is a question of whether NATO would stay the same as it was in 1949, when it was established, or turn into an organization adequate for today's reality and which is not looking for its enemy in the East, but meets the challenges of the modern era and focuses its attention on ethnic conflicts, on the increasing illegal arms trade, on the fight against drug trafficking, and similar problems—that is to say: challenges that have to be faced by the whole of Europe. This is the other side of the question, which we discussed with our Hungarian counterparts at our talks two weeks ago.

Another question also has to be raised: The Hungarian Army has to be supplied with new equipment, which costs a great deal. What kind of price has to be paid for joining NATO? And there is another problem as well. At the moment, only soldiers of the Hungarian Army are stationed in Hungary. If Hungary joins NATO, Hungary will have to undertake an obligation to allow the stationing of NATO troops in Hungary. Military units from any of the NATO countries can come into question. I wonder, whether you would like if, just as an example, German soldiers appeared on the nation's territory. [end recording]

[Announcer] How do you, Foreign Minister Kovacs, comment on the remarks of the Russian deputy foreign minister? [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] I would like to say, first and foremost, that there are two important things: One is that Russia should not feel that the extension of NATO is something that threatens its own security. This is primarily the task of NATO, but Hungary can also contribute to this. The other thing, speficically, is that Russia should not feel that Hungary's accession to NATO would have any kind of negative effect on Hungarian-Russian relations. There are signs that Russia does not perceive it in this way.

The stationing of foreign troops in Hungary is one of the conditions of membership and, for the time being, we are not holding talks on this issue yet. Therefore nothing concrete can be said about this today. In principle, it is possible that this will take place. However, all in all, I have to say what has been stressed in NATO: Membership is not a one-way street. It does not only imply advantages but obligations as well, as is the case with European Union membership. The important point is that the public should be precisely aware of the advantages and obligations, and should know that the balance of them is certainly positive.

[Announcer] There was a foreign policy debate in parliament this week, where most of the questions were related to the planned basic treaties [with Slovakia and Romania]. [passage omitted] Our neighbors are asking for certain things—namely border guarantees—from us. What is the minimum the Hungarian government insists on as guarantees, primarily for the Hungarian minority beyond the border?

[Kovacs] What the Hungarian government insists on is that the rights of the Hungarian minority should be guaranteed in accordance with European documents, European standards, in order that this minority can preserve and further develop its ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious identity. This is the minimum we insist on. Looking at these things in a realistic way, I also have a feeling that this is also the maximum that can be achieved today.

[Announcer] These have to be put in a certain form. [passage omitted]

[Kovacs] Basic treaties are precisely about this. I do not really understand the objections of the opposition when they argue against the conclusion of basic treaties. We want to incorporate the itemized list of international documents—the documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations—which we have so far referred to and which meant a political undertaking by Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and all the other signatories. When these documents are included in a bilateral interstate agreement—and this is the aim we insist on—they will become internal law in the two countries concerned. This is an enormous difference from the present situation, when the rights of the Hungarian minority are not guaranteed by any kind of international document with legal force. This will be the change following the conclusion of the basic treaties. [passage omitted]

Privatization Minister-Designate Views Policies

AU2402174595 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 22 Feb 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Tamas Suchman, designated minister without portfolio responsible for privatization, by Laszlo

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Gergely on 21 February; place not given: "Politics Will Not Enter the Property Manager's Door"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] *We first asked Suchman about the privatization draft bill.*

[Gergely] Are preparations for the privatization bill not too early, considering that the finance minister-designate [Lajos Bokros] would like to have some decisions made, some of which might even require law amendments?

[Suchman] The two working groups dealing with the privatization bill have managed to fit the future finance minister's proposals into the amendment package that they have been dealing with since mid-November 1994. This is important because there is no danger, then, that we cannot have the law passed by the date we proposed. Bokros's ideas mostly coincide with the views of the two working groups.

[Gergely] Bokros can only think in terms of a single-center economic policy, the one that was accepted by the economic cabinet. The privatization strategy must not differ from this, either.

[Suchman] I agree with this. A government that has many centers of economic policy has no credibility, and is also unacceptable for the international financial environment. Therefore, a single-center economic policy is needed, and the economic cabinet and the finance minister are responsible for this. [passage omitted]

[Gergely] In the past few years, privatization sometimes represented the heavy interests of employment policy, while at other times it acted according to cash interests. However, the former interests tended to be stronger and professional arguments were not really heard. Successful privatization actually works in favor of employment policy.

[Suchman] [passage omitted] The buyer obviously invests money and risks it because he wants to operate the property he bought. The state, or the privatization organization can only exert its influence at the time the contracts are made. Employment considerations cannot prevail on their own because the owner cannot be told how many people to employ while he might not have markets, current assets, or might not even have clear and long-term ideas on the operation itself. The application need not be accepted if the buyer's offer does not contain enough guarantees for the company's future operation, and he intends to gain advantages for himself by selling or losing the assets. However, if it is clear from the offer that he wants, and is able, to operate the enterprise in the long run—by acquiring markets and providing resources—and the relevant privatization organization assesses and decides the deal on this basis, then at the same time it will also consider employment aspects. When a buyer guarantees his ability to function, then he is also guaranteeing employment. [passage omitted]

[Gergely] One of Bokros's ideas is that the assets managed by the State Property Agency [AVU] should be privatized for compensation notes, while the assets of the State Property Management Corporation [AVRT] should be properly managed and privatized through cash deals or a significant capital increase. Do you share these views?

[Suchman] In principle, I also agree that the AVU should be "cleared out." It obviously has to be ensured that the guarantees and obligations that have been taken on by the AVU can be handled. I would not like to talk about the techniques because we have not yet accepted the law and many details are still being worked on. It is important to be able to honestly keep the government's promises made in connection with the use of the compensation notes, and I agree that the real assets that can be sold and for which money can be expected should remain with the AVRT. In my view, asset management has to be equally strict everywhere while the state is the owner. In my view, in addition to the methods of sales and the low revenue, one of the biggest deficiencies of the recent period's privatization has been the fact that the asset management did not function well. A country struggling with the amount of budget deficit we have must not lose a cent; therefore, we will pay a very strict attention to asset management.

Details of Short-Term Austerity Plan Published

AU2702144595 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Feb 95 pp 1, 11

[Article by "V.I.": "The Stabilization Program Before the Government—Welfare Spending To Be Reduced by 11-12 Billion Forints—Strict Austerity Measures"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The current budget deficit must be reduced to $2.5 billion, and the state administration's expected 330-to-340-billion-forint deficit must be reduced to 200 billion forints. Annual inflation must not exceed 25 percent. According to our information, these are among the goals laid down in the short-term action plan for stabilization.

The government is expected to discuss this plan at its session today. The government suggests the introduction of several radical measures to restore the balance. It decided in early February that measures have to be taken to reduce the 1995 current deficit in the balance of payments and in the state administration. The ministries put forward their proposals to the Finance Ministry more than a week ago, and they then prepared the material for the government. The prime minister discussed the adjustment measures for economic stabilization in 1995 with 15 economic and financial experts on 20 February.

Without an overall intervention, there is a danger—the proposal says—that last year's high current balance of payments deficit will not decrease this year either, and that the country's debt will increase significantly. Financial experts consider 1995 to be a key year from the point of view of economic processes. In their view, it is either

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possible to achieve significant progress in economic stabilization, thus laying the foundation of the beginning of a sustainable economic growth, or a critical situation will arise, and conditions for another decline and lasting stagnation will develop in the economy.

A reduction of the current balance of payments deficit to $2.5 billion has to be achieved—which has to be counterbalanced by a similar level of foreign capital inflow. In other words, the net foreign debt must not significantly increase. To reduce the state administration's expected 330-340 billion forints deficit to 200 billion forints is also one of the goals. The government wishes to reduce inflation to an annual 25 percent. If these stabilization goals are achieved then the decrease of real earnings per earner will be bigger than planned, and consumption will also be reduced. At the same time, investments will increase faster than planned and the competitiveness of enterprises will be improved. If all these conditions are realized, then GDP would remain at the 1994 level this year.

The proposal also details the measures necessary to achieve these goals. They are characterized by the following: Resources will be ensured for the enterprises; the competitiveness of producers will improve; investments will increase; and inflation will increase temporarily by a small degree. The measures have to be taken immediately, in March and April and in the second half of the year. Financial experts also warn that some measures will unfavorably affect various strata of society; therefore, it will not be possible to gain the support of the social partners. In fact, part of the agreement made with the Interest Coordination Council in connection with the 1995 economic processes cannot be maintained, either.

The action plan includes proposals for measures that help boost exports, reduce imports, reduce state administration expenditure, and contribute to the stability of the financial balance. In order to expand exports, some 10 billion forints will be regrouped in the budget for export incentives.

To reduce the growth of imports, the possibility will be examined of introducing a system in which only those enterprises will be given import licenses—for products that come under import and authorization procedures—which do not have customs, duty, consumer tax, or value-added tax debts. In order to increase privatization revenue, privatizations will be speeded up. They are planning strict control of wage costs in state-owned and local government-owned companies.

The measures to improve the state administration's situation are aimed at increasing revenue, and mainly at reducing expenditure. For example, welfare spending would be reduced by 11-12 billion forints. In the course of this, it is suggested to change the current family allowance system to a means-tested one. The legal entitlements having to do with childcare allowances will not be extended this year. It is also suggested that the 4.7 billion forints that had been approved for single payments for family support in 1994 should not be paid out. Instead, this sum should be placed into general reserve. Several restrictive measures are also planned in the area of social insurance. For example, contributions should be paid on all incomes, and the rules of sickness benefits should also be made stricter. According to the proposal, the employer would pay the first 25 days' sick leave in contrast to the current 10 days.

Some 20 billion forints' improvement in the financial position is expected from these measures. It is also suggested to abolish the allowance for home construction—which is paid according to the number of children in the family—above a certain income level.

Central financial support will be reduced in the case of central-budget-financed organizations: Payments to individuals will be reduced by 2 percent. The purchase of office furniture and cars will be suspended. A 10-percent staff reduction should be achieved in the ministries, national institutions, and other administrative institutions—except for the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing, the National Headquarters of the Customs and Revenue Police, and the Police. The number of military conscripts should be reduced by 5,000 and the staff of Hungarian Television by 500-1,000.

Among the special funds, a savings of some 9 billion forints is planned in the expenditure of the Solidarity and Employment Funds.

As part of the package of measures, a government commissioner would be appointed to direct the government's steps against the black economy. There are plans to make the inspection of tax, financial, customs, labor affairs, and the social insurance more rigorous.

All these are only proposals, the government will decide whether to accept or reject them.

Police Spokesman Assesses Reorganization Tasks

AU2802103895 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 27 Feb pp 1, 4

[Interview with Border Police Spokesman Attila Krisan by "Botlik"; place and date not given: "We Also Defend the Western Borders by Strengthening the Eastern Borders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The internal life of the Border Police has been quite hectic in recent weeks. Reorganization is proceeding at a good pace and current frameworks are being considerably reorganized. We asked Border Police Spokesman Attila Krisan about all this.*

[Krisan] The reorganization affects primarily the western areas where the leading, control, and supply bodies of the border police directorates of Sopron and Zalaegerszeg will be abolished by 31 March this year. This became necessary because, in addition to the aforementioned directorates, there are two more directorates

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operating along the 356-km-long Hungarian-Austrian border, namely Gyor and Szombathely. These used to be border police districts and this system originated from the concept of past decades. The Hungarian-Austrian border received special treatment regarding both staff and guidance, and this border was specially defended; the famous alarm system and the "iron curtain" were dismantled only five years ago.

[Botlik] What does the reorganization mean?

[Krisan] It means not only that the aforementioned directorates in Sopron and Zalaegerszeg will be dismantled but also that the leading and guiding bodies will also change. The reorganization of the western border police is part of the national reorganization of the border police: the Supply and Border Traffic directorates in Budapest were combined on 31 January, and a uniform border police directorate was created in Budapest. A border police training institute will be set up on the premises of the former border police directorate in Sopron; at the same time, the training camp in Siklos, which belongs to Pecs, will be dismantled.

[Botlik] What do you expect from the reorganization?

[Krisan] First of all the simplification of leadership and guidance. Of course, a precondition for this was the development and more effective operation of computerized systems. At the same time, the staff released in the course of this reorganization is an essential element of border police restructuring as a whole, because this enables us to shift to professional border-guarding along open borders by the end of this year. This has already been achieved at border crossing points over the past two years.

[Botlik] What are the advantages of a professional border police?

[Krisan] The new law on foreigners became valid on 1 May 1994, and this new law is stricter than the previous one in some areas. Observing the rules requires a thorough knowledge of rights and possibilities, and this requires professional border guards who know these rules well. Regular army conscripts do not have any authority in this respect, but the professional border guards have this authority. The essential thing is to deal with illegal actions that occur at the border crossing or in the open field at that location, so that the border violators do not have to be taken into the country and guarded and fed until the authorities get around to dealing with their case. The border police is part of the Armed Forces, and they defend the country by protecting the border and carrying out police activity. The professional border guards patrol the area and protect the border, while the regular conscripts serve in the oft-mentioned border guard units. The professional border guards are professional people. Recently, for example, one such professional stopped 65 people who tried to illegally cross the Hungarian-Slovenian border in the vicinity of Redics.

[Botlik] Is the professional border police a step toward professionalism?

[Krisan] Yes. The aforementioned creation of the training institute in Sopron also serves this purpose. The training of professional border guards will commence here in September 1995 and will last two years. The border guard directorates in Szombathely and at our eastern border at Nyirbator and Oroshaza must fully shift to professional border guards. Some 700 staff, especially warrant officers, became available after the closure of the directorates in Sopron and Zalaegerszeg and the reorganizations in Budapest, and they will strengthen the professional staff already operating in various areas from Zahony to Nagylak. The number of border police units will increase to 26 by the end of this year.

[Botlik] Why is it necessary to protect the Hungarian-Ukrainian and Hungarian-Romanian borders more strictly?

[Krisan] First of all because migration is heading from East to West. In January, we had to take measures against 1,132 persons for illegal acts committed at the borders: 286 persons tried to illegally cross the borders at Oroshaza, 260 at Gyor, 224 at Kiskunhalas, 110 at Nyirbator, and 22 at Szombathely, including 417 Romanians, 236 former Yugoslavs, 79 Turks, and 40 Ukrainians. Thus, by strengthening our eastern borders, we also defend the western borders. This is also necessary because Austria does not have a separate border police. Their Police and Army carry out the tasks jointly. We recently received the good news that they have also begun to organize the professional border police. In connection with Austria's EU membership, we see that they have not yet made border control stricter, but they operate well: They returned 53 border violators in January. It is not accidental that, lately, illegal emigrants attempt to cross the border to Slovenia and get to the West through Italy. Besides, Austria will most probably join the Schengen Agreement sooner or later, an agreement that stipulates stricter border control for EU members.

Justice Ministry Moves To Discipline Judges

95CH0119D Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 9 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Andras Sereg: "I Am Obliged To Take Disciplinary Action—Justice Minister Pal Vastagh Justifies Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The matter must be clarified to prevent even the shadow of a suspicion that courts of law in the Republic of Hungary can be directly or indirectly influenced," announced the justice minister at a news briefing to discuss disciplinary action against the chief justices of six counties (Bacs, Fejer, Gyor, Komarom, Nograd, Veszprem) and Budapest, and two chiefs of colleges. Pal Vastagh emphasized that after he took

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office, he assured the chief justices of the counties of his complete trust, and his trust remains unchanged.

In the Friday issue of UJ MAGYARORSZAG an article was published entitled "Destruction of the Courts of Law Has Begun," according to which the justice minister has taken disciplinary action against almost ten county chief justices.

The article contains untrue statements, we heard at the news briefing on Sunday afternoon. Speaking of the preliminaries to the case, Pal Vastagh told us that the justices themselves informed the ministry in August that a foundation working in West Europe and the U.S. sent an invitation through a Hungarian company to judges specializing in liquidation and bankruptcy procedures. The invitation was for a two-week professional visit to New York, approximately worth 500,000 forints, the minister said. In connection with the trip scheduled for 23 September to 7 October, on 13 September the minister summoned the county chief justices, because a reasonable suspicion arose that taking advantage of the trip was incompatible with the office of judge because the invitations came from "potential clients" and were "based on unknown selection criteria." At the conference, attended by all chief justices, Vastagh asked the chief justices to consider whether to permit the judges under their auspices to participate in the trip.

Half of the Invited Judges Went on the Trip

"In accordance with the law on the organization of the courts, the county chief justices should have taken disciplinary action against the judges who went on the trip, but this did not happen. Because of this omission, I was duty-bound by the law to take disciplinary action against the county chief justices in question," the minister said. "A judge who through his lifestyle or behavior offends or endangers the honor of the judiciary commits a disciplinary offense," he said, citing Article No. 63 of the law. According to the head of the portfolio, participation in the trip compromised the honor of the judiciary.

"The matter must be clarified in order to avoid even the shadow of a suspicion that courts of law in the Republic of Hungary can be directly or indirectly influenced," he said.

At the request of NEPSZABADSAG, Pal Vastagh explained that before the action, he consulted Pal Solt, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shared his misgivings about the trip.

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Russians Block Trucks Returning From Chechnya

LD2402201295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Despite protest notes from the Polish Embassy in Moscow to the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries, Russian soldiers are refusing to let through Polish humanitarian aid trucks returning home from Chechnya. Janina Ochojska reports:

[Ochojska] The convoy has been waiting at the Chechen-Dagestan border for the past two days. The Russians issued an order to block the border crossing. The commander of the units guarding the border seemed willing to let us pass, but we overheard the order issued in Russian over the telephone not to let us pass.

The Chechens would like to help us, and they know different illegal routes leading to places where we could cross the border, but we know we could have problems with our convoy at subsequent control points. When we attempted to settle our passage, the Russians tried to force one of our colleagues to sign a document stating that we had not known what our cargo contained. I think the Russians are refusing to let us pass because the whole convoy was unloaded in Chechnya, and was for the Chechens.

[Announcer] The contact with Janina Ochojska was made possible by reporters of the Polish Radio Third Program and Radio Zet, who are in the convoy. Thank you very much.

Walesa Returns to Warsaw, Comments on Situation

LD2602142195 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1300 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 26 Feb—After his return from South America, President Lech Walesa told journalists on 26 February that everything indicated that he would meet Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy on 27 February. The president added, however, that the meeting had not been arranged yet and that "two are needed" for such a meeting.

Answering a question whether he would accept the government formed by the coalition candidate for prime minister, the president said that he had just returned, that he obviously had been in touch with the country, but he was dealing with other matters. "I had a meeting with Oleksy, and this was a good meeting, but he was the head of one of the group of the Polish community in Brazil." (This is a reference to a meeting of the president with Anisio Oleksy, a relative of the Sejm speaker and activist of a Polonian organization in Brazil.) The president added: "I think that there will be talks devoted to the matters you are asking about."

Asked about a chance for a compromise with regard to the appointment in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Defense, and Internal Affairs, and responding to a remark that Oleksy said that he could not imagine forming a government that had no presidential approval for these three posts, the president said that "not only these three. I also think that with regard I am going to suggest a few things to Mr. Oleksy to some other ministries. It looks to me that several ministerial posts had been chosen more as the result of a 'trade-off' than for their abilities. I would like it to be a good government, better than the previous one, able to cope with tasks we are facing. (...) That is why I am not prepared for trade-offs, and I would rather Mr. Oleksy adopted the same attitude, so we could do as much as possible for the country. I am not a tradesman. I want to serve the nation, and I chose the best options."

Are we talking about economic ministries, asked a journalist, referring to the word "trade" used by the president. "Yes. Some economic decisions are awful and have been very badly received by the West. I was accompanied by some of these people to the West, and to Japan, and I heard these great economists, and they made themselves look ridiculous. Perhaps Mr. Oleksy does not know about this, and one will have to make some suggestions," the president said.

Asked about his view on the rise in interest rates and on the loan contracted in the West by Grzegorz Kolodko, the president replied that "it should not be like that. Such ambitions and animosity should not exist."

"Give me some time. Wachowski has not resigned, so this is not the matter under consideration. He worked quite well during this visit. I have no objections, and I know that he has not prepared his notice," replied Walesa, when asked whether he had already decided who was going to remain in his Chancellery: Wachowski or Falandysz [deputy head of the Chancellery].

Oleksy To Decide on Forming Government Today

LD2802160495 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1507 GMT 28 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 28 Feb—Jozef Oleksy, the coalition's candidate for prime minister, will make a decision on whether or not to form a government later today, after a meeting of the Polish Peasant Party and Democratic Left Alliance parliamentary floor groups.

At a news conference this afternoon, Oleksy pointed out that he could not see the possibility of forming a new cabinet unless he is met with goodwill on the part of the president. "I am afraid that today's meeting has been a signal that there is no such goodwill," he added.

According to Oleksy, it is necessary to clarify whether both sides understand Article 58 of the small constitution in the same way with regard to the appointment of a government in a parliamentary manner. The speaker insists that he is the one who understands the Constitution correctly. In accordance with this option, the government, by the will of the legislator, is appointed by the

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Sejm, after the prime minister-designate has sought the president's opinion on the appointments of the heads of the MSW [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the MSZ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], and MON [Ministry of National Defense], and after having signed these nominations.

The speaker said that he had asked the president that question. He explained that the president had replied that the very fact that the Sejm speaker came to see him in order to discuss the appointment of a government could be regarded as an attempt to incite a coup d'etat and, consequently, an attempt to violate the Constitution. There was also a remark whether the speaker should not face the State Tribunal, Oleksy added.

According to the speaker, the president does not believe that his role boils down to the signing of the nomination motions after they have been passed by the Sejm.

Talks With Walesa Very Difficult

LD2802121495 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 28 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski told Polish radio today that the talk between President Lech Walesa and [Sejm Speaker] Jozef Oleksy, the candidate for prime minister, was very difficult. He also said that the Speaker had come for the talks ill-prepared and without authority to conduct negotiations on the forming of new government.

[Begin Spalinski recording] I have to say with regret that today's talk between the president and the Speaker was very difficult. Difficult, first of all, because the president had again to reproach a high state official with departing from the law. Unfortunately, the Speaker came for the meeting ill-prepared, without authority to conduct talks on the formation of a new government. The Speaker agreed with the president's opinion, he agreed that the constitution requires a politician to be designated for prime minister by the Sejm before talks are held with the president on the shape of a new government. In this connection the talks were quickly concluded.

We can easily imagine a situation when an official, say from the president's Chancellery, begins this kind of activity. Then there would be a big noise around the matter and talk about extra- constitutional activities.

The lack of preparation by the Speaker concerned matters connected with a structure of the government itself. It appears today that the deputy prime minister posts are apparently still vacant, and the coalition is expected to make final decisions on matters this afternoon. [end recording]

TV Gives Details of Government

LD2402213295 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government now being formed by Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy will most probably have seven new ministers. The following people will not be in it: Leslaw Podkanski, Andrzej Smietanko, and Michal Strak. Nine ministers will be from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and eight from the Polish Peasant Party [PSL].

According to decisions made last night at a meeting of the coalition, Jozef Oleksy's cabinet will have just one deputy prime minister. This post will be given to Aleksander Luczak from the PSL. Grzegorz Kolodko, who hoped to keep his post of deputy prime minister, is not satisfied with this decision. He was offered the posts of finance minister and chairman of the Council of Ministers Economic Committee. Professor Kolodko said today that he had not yet made a final decision on his further participation in the government.

There is uncertainty as to who will take the post of head of the Council of Ministers' Office. In the so-called presidential ministries there is just one certain candidate: Andrzej Milczanowski as the minister of internal affairs. Jozef Oleksy will have to discuss the names of the defense and foreign affairs' ministers with the president. However, the names of all other candidates for ministers are known: Wieslaw Kaczmarek, holding the post of minister of ownership transformations, will retain his post; Barbara Blida, holding the post of minister of construction, will retain her post; the Central Planning Office and the Ministry of Justice will be managed by their current heads, Miroslaw Pietrewicz and Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz respectively. Labor Minister Leszek Miller and Transport Minister Boguslaw Liberadzki will retain their posts, as well as the heads of health and communications—Jacek Zochowski and Andrzej Zielinski.

Stanislaw Zelichowski and Kazimierz Dejmek will remain the ministers of environmental protection and culture respectively. Leslaw Podkanski, the current minister of foreign economic cooperation, will go. He will be replaced by the current deputy health minister, Jacek Buchacz. Agriculture Minister Andrzej Smietanko will be replaced by Roman Jagielinski, currently the chairman of the Sejm Agriculture Commission.

Marek Pol, the industry minister, will leave the government. His place will be taken by Klemens Scierski, currently the director of the Laziska heat generating plant.

Ryszard Czarny from the SLD will be a new minister. Currently the deputy Senate speaker, he will take the post of minister of national education, a post so far held by a PSL member. The PSL will take over the Committee for Scientific Research, which will be headed by Warsaw University Professor Jozef Szaflik.

Kolodko Interviewed on Role in Oleksy's Cabinet

LD2402162995 Warsaw Radio Zet in Polish 0710 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer Woyciechowski] Radio Zet's guest today is Grzegorz Kolodko, the deputy

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prime minister and finance minister in Waldemar Pawlak's government and the finance minister, head of the Council of Ministers' Economic Committee and plenipotentiary for reforms of the economic center in the government which may be formed by Jozef Oleksy. [passage omitted]

[Woyciechowski] You have met Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy a few times. Did he give you the go ahead, give you a green light for the Strategy for Poland program?

[Kolodko] Well, you talk about lights. I recently heard [President] Lech Walesa saying that this light is amber and flashing, and that someone stopped, and then later moved forward. Well...

[Woyciechowski interrupting] No. Did you agree the economic strategy for the next six months or year or didn't you?

[Kolodko] Not to the extent that I could explicitly say today that what the new government will be doing after it is formed is what I care about. Negotiations about this continue and if Sejm Speaker Oleksy's statements about my participation in the government are being reported correctly then they are premature.

[Woyciechowski] So you have not made a decision on becoming the finance minister in the new cabinet?

[Kolodko] I made a number of decisions about how to conduct economic and financial policy in the interest of Polish society, the economy, and the state. I asked the political leadership of the coalition a number of questions...

[Woyciechowski interrupting] What were those most important questions?

[Kolodko] The most important questions were: How will the Strategy for Poland be implemented at this stage? Is there full determination by the political leadership of the coalition and possibly the new government to implement the financial policy strictly in accordance with the budget this year? I expect from candidates for new ministers univocal support and I expect them to identify with the Stategy for Poland program.

[Woyciechowski] So there is no unanimous yes so far?

[Kolodko] I don't even know who is in this new Council of Ministers. If I were to manage this group I would do that on condition that I knew and was convinced that we work on similar wavelengths and that we implement the same program, and not that other ministers would hinder my implementing the program whose validity I am convinced of.

[Woyciechowski] Thank you very much. Today's guest of Radio Zet was Grzegorz Kolodko, the deputy prime minister and finance minister and probably finance minister in the new government. Thank you.

[Kolodko] We have a government for the present. Thank you.

Poll Shows Decreasing Support for Pawlak, Cabinet

WS2702131195 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 27 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by "NIKA": "Unloved; Who Supports Them Today?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The percentage of opponents of the Pawlak cabinet has substantially exceeded the percentage of its supporters.

Early in February the Pawlak government enjoyed the support of 24 percent of the respondents. Its opponents constituted 36 percent—this is the result of the latest report prepared by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS]. Over one-third (35 percent) of Poles feel indifferent toward the cabinet whose fate will most probably be decided by the Sejm on 1 or 2 March.

It is worth recalling that when it was being formed, the cabinet enjoyed enormous support—it was backed by 61 percent of the Poles. After a period of eighteen months, during which numerous fraudulent dealings, involving cabinet members, were disclosed, this government is supported by fewer people than the Suchocka government right before the vote of no confidence was passed (it was supported by 32 percent of the respondents at that time).

Evaluation of Pawlak's ministers is worse than the support for the government. Most respondents (52 percent) express negative opinions on the results of this government's work. Only one-third of the respondents voice positive opinions.

We had a much better opinion about the achievements of the previous government in the same period of its activity. The persons who expressed positive opinions (49 percent) were more numerous than those who voiced negative views (34 percent).

Since March 1994 the percentage of persons who are convinced that the Pawlak government is not creating any chance for improving the economic situation has been steadily increasing; right now as many as 60 percent of the respondents express such a view.

Since the government was formed, Waldemar Pawlak had usually been evaluated much more favorably than the cabinet which he headed. Until October this prime minister had more supporters than opponents. In February dissatisfaction with Pawlak as prime minister was declared by half of the respondents, whereas every third respondent was satisfied.

The resignation of the government seems to be a foregone conclusion; it does not whip up emotions. At the beginning of February 38 percent of the respondents would have received information on the resignation of

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the government with indifference. Persons who declared satisfaction with such a development were more numerous (28 percent) than those who declared disapproval (23 percent).

Moderate Support From Their Own Voters Instead of Initial Approval From Most of Society

Prime Minister Pawlak and his government have more opponents than supporters, suggests the CBOS research. Right after the government was formed, it enjoyed considerable support from nearly all social groups. It was supported first and foremost by inhabitants of rural areas, mainly peasants, persons with elementary education, and persons with leftist views.

Currently the relatively best opinions on the outgoing government are expressed by persons who sympathize with the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] (48 percent of them consider themselves supporters of the present cabinet), as well as by supporters of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] (43 percent). PSL voters, in turn, are more favorably disposed toward the prime minister (in February 66 percent declared satisfaction with the fact that he was heading the government) than voters of SLD (43 percent) are.

Peasants, who until recently were the most powerful support group of the government, have been increasingly more reserved toward the cabinet for some time now. Right after the government was formed, eight out of ten considered themselves its supporters; right now they do not exceed 34 percent. This does not mean distrust toward Pawlak—most peasants (55 percent) are still satisfied that he is prime minister.

The most numerous group of opponents of both the prime minister and his ministers comes from groupings of the extraparliamentary right wing, the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, Confederation for an Independent Poland, "Solidarity," Freedom Union, and Labor Union.

Representatives of the management cadres, intelligentsia, private entrepreneurs, as well as persons with university degrees belong to the group of the most adamant critics of the present cabinet.

The research was carried out by CBOS between 3 and 6 February on a random sample of 1,223 persons.

SdRP Accepts Coalition Agreement with PSL

LD2702165895 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1529 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 27 Feb—The Supreme Council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] has accepted the coalition agreement with the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and given its "total support" to Jozef Oleksy's government-forming mission. According to the SdRP, this government should be formed "with a complete adherence to constitutional principles by the supreme state bodies."

The SdRP Supreme Council has found the following to be the most important issues in the coalition program:

—taking consistent actions aimed at the suppression of inflation and supporting development tendencies in the economy;

—carrying out and implementing the reform of the system of social insurance;

—carrying out the reform of the economic administration center, followed by the decentralization of the tasks and prerogatives of the state administration center;

—taking effective action to ensure security of citizens and the protection of law and order;

—strengthening Poland's image in the world and speeding up integration with European structures;

—implementation of new information policies, which will clarify the government's actions and win social support for them.

Senate Speaker Says Walesa May Face Impeachment

LD2702214595 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 2000 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent Kowalski] A phrase mentioning the State Tribunal has appeared yet again in a statement made by an influential politician from the government coalition. In Olsztyn today, Senate Speaker Adam Struzik spoke about the possibility of the president having to face the tribunal.

[Begin Struzik recording] I myself have criticized the breach of the present government's status quo from the very beginning because I expected this sort of danger. Some of my colleagues were very adamant when they said that in a situation like this the president will have to face the State Tribunal. In the constitutional sense, that is the case. [end recording]

[Kowalski] It is inadmissible that anyone can interpret the Constitution as they want. Very serious solutions will take place, Speaker Struzik said.

Solidarity Organizes Arms, Aviation Protest

LD2702125995 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1200 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A nationwide protest action, organized by Solidarity, has begun in all arms and aviation-industry factories. Stanislaw Glowacki, chairman of the Solidarity national division of the arms industry, said that the union is protesting against the government not entering talks with workers on the restructuring of this sector of industry.

Roman Czerwinski, deputy industry and trade minister, denies that the protest is connected with the Polish-U.S.

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talks on the purchase of F-16 fighters. The deputy minister stressed that any purchase of weapons and armaments by Poland must be accompanied by agreements on production cooperation.

Republic Interested in Purchasing F-16 Planes

WS2702131295 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 25-26 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Tadeusz Zachurski in Washington: "Poland Is Interested in U.S. Arms: Will the F-16's Come?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Deputy Defense Minister in charge of logistics General Jan Kuriata is examining the possibilities of purchasing U.S. military equipment during talks held at the Pentagon.

The list of U.S. military equipment which Poland is interested in obtaining or buying was presented to the Pentagon prior to the visit of current head of the Defense Ministry Jerzy Milewski who met U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry last week. During Jerzy Milewski's visit, the U.S. Administration announced that all restrictions on sales of ultramodern military equipment—including weapons used on the battlefield—to Poland and nine other Central and East European states were lifted. Decisions on the sales of U.S. arms, according to William Perry, will be made individually for each state on the basis of separate applications.

After talks held on Thursday at the Pentagon, General Jan Kuriata informed that Poland is interested primarily in purchasing command systems. The specific types of weaponry mentioned by General Kuriata were armored personnel carriers and older types of F-16's. Poland is considering the possibility of purchasing twelve F-16 fighter planes and several training aircraft.

Poland would like to pay for supplies partly with spare parts for the F-16's and military equipment of Polish make. According to General Kuriata, the Americans have basically agreed. "This does not mean, however, that we will purchase the equipment once the negotiations end," said General Kuriata. Pentagon Spokesman Tom La Rock then said that the United States has received no formal application for F-16 purchases. If they had, it would be examined separately. The production of spare parts for the F-16's in Poland would require the U.S. Government's permission to transfer modern technology abroad.

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UDMR Official on Odorheiu Secuiesc Events

95P20550A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 11-12 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Adrian Ursu: "'Hungarians in Romania Observe the Natural Laws, Not the Laws Imposed by Parliament,' the Chairman of the Council of UDMR Mayors and Councillors Insolently Asserts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The events organized in Odorheiu Secuiesc on 4 February on the occasion of the unveiling of the statue of Orban Balazs aroused an extremely prompt reaction from the government, which announced the establishment of a governmental investigatory commission. The principal charges levied against the organizers referred to the intoning, at the beginning of the festivities, of the Hungarian national anthem and the displaying of the Hungarian state flag. Although such charges had been made a number of times, after other similar actions organized by the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR in Romanian, RMDSZ in Hungarian], this is the first time that such an investigation has been undertaken by the executive. The basis for this step was the enactment, on 26 August 1994, of the law on displaying the Romanian flag, singing the national anthem and the use, by the authorities and by public institutions, of seals with the coat of arms of Romania.

The law states explicitly that: "Flags of other countries can be displayed on Romanian territory only with the Romanian flag and only on the occasion of visits of an official state nature and international festivities and meetings, on official buildings and in public places stipulated in accordance with the provisions of the present law" (Article 7) while "the national anthem of other states is intoned on the occasion of official visits, festivities and ceremonies of an international nature, together with and prior to the Romanian national anthem" (Article 14).

Before the Victoria Palace [governmental] monitoring team discloses the conclusions of the investigation, we will present a few of our on-site findings.

For Ferenc Ferenczi, the mayor of Odorheiu Secuiesc, everything is clear and the charges are far from being justified. The great one of Odorheiu is of the opinion that he did not violate the law since it was not the Hungarian national anthem that was sung at the 4 February events but an ancient prayer chant of the Szeklers [Hungarians living in Transylvania since the 12th or 13th century]. It is pure coincidence that this prayer asking God's help for the Szeklers was adopted by the Hungarian state as its national anthem—Ferenc Ferenczi says slyly. It is also a coincidence that the neighboring country, Hungary, used the traditional Szekler colors—red, white and green—for its flag. So, at Saturday's ceremonies in Odorheiu Secuiesc, "the Hungarian national anthem was not sung and the Hungarian flag was not displayed" (sic!).

We received the same explanation of the colors and the verses, with an amazing exactness in the reproduction of historic theory, from Pal Vilmos Santha [Santa], chairman of the Harghita County Council and head of the recently established UDMR Council of Mayors and Councillors. He informed us that he does not see any danger in these actions since they are natural occurrences that come from sentiments that cannot be limited.

The adoption by the Odorheiu Secuiescu local council of the coat of arms of the city, which is a copy of the old coat of arms from the 16th century, is also normal for Ferenc Ferenczi. The mayor of the city told us what the heraldic symbols mean: the armor-clad arm with the sword is the symbol of the heroism of the Szeklers guarding the Hungarian border; the bear's head impaled rigidly in the sword represents the courage of this people while the heart and the crown represent the fidelity of the Szeklers to the Hungarian throne. The mayor hastened to explain that this coat of arms was used not only during the time of the kingdom and the empire but also when there were other forms of government (?!) and that it symbolizes attachment to the central authority. Is this clear or isn't it? We did not receive a more precise definition of the location of this central point. The five stars on the coat of arms represent the five seats (administrative units) that have been established in the zone. They are also reproduced on the city's flag, which was adopted by the local council in 1992 and which is a replica of the flag of the Council of Europe, with seven fewer stars. But the message is the same.

Discussing, with Pal Vilmos Santha, the laws and their supremacy in a democratic country, we found out that there are numerous provisions of the law with which Hungarians in Romania do not agree. Therefore, they cannot observe them. These include Article 26 of the Law on Local Public Administration, which clearly states that the local council should use only the Romanian language in its proceedings. Mr. Santha tried to convince us that this is absurd since there are localities in which all the members of the council are Hungarians and do not know legal terms in the Romanian language and therefore cannot use this language. "In the permanent delegation of the county council, we have only one Romanian woman and therefore, out of politeness and for no other reason, we speak Romanian in our sessions. These are things that should not be imposed by law but which come from good sense." Mr. Santha has the same opinion about the matter of the national anthem. Pointing out that, in contrast to other nations (without specifying), the Szeklers did not change their spiritual hymn on the basis of the direction of the wind, he told us that the Szeklers remained faithful to their anthem (the one which "just happens" to be Hungary's anthem too), and, therefore, they cannot be prevented by law from singing it when they deem it to be proper. There are natural laws which the legislator cannot obstruct. They come from sentiments which cannot be limited by laws handed down by Parliament.

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'Anti-Romanian' Actions of UDMR Listed

95P20529A Bucharest ROMANIA MARE in Romanian 3 Feb 95 p 8

["Text" of appeal of Greater Romania Party: "Black Book of Anti-Romanian and Antidemocratic Actions That the UDMR Terrorist Organization Has Been Carrying on Against Romania for Almost Five Years"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1) The vote of parliamentarians belonging to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] against the Romanian Constitution adopted in 1991 by the Constituent Assembly; urging other parliamentarians to boycott.

2) Disputing the character of Romania as a unitary and indivisible national state.

3) Disputing the status of the Romanian language as the official language and exerting pressure for the imposition of the Hungarian language as the official language in Transylvania, falsely citing so-called similar situations in other countries.

4) Disregarding the fundamental obligations of the citizens of the country, regardless of nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, opinion, or political affiliation, such as fidelity to the country, respect for the Constitution and for its supremacy, and respect for the laws.

5) Persecuting Hungarian-minority citizens who are not members of the UDMR and do not support its policy, going so far as to threaten them with physical extermination, condemning mixed marriages, etc.

6) Inciting the anti-Romanian demonstrations in Tirgu-Mures in March 1990, which degenerated into street battles with human casualties.

7) Separating the schools on the basis of ethnic criteria, oppressing pupils, and teaching cadres of Romanian nationality in educational units in which both Romanian and Hungarian are the languages of instruction in all counties in Transylvania and in Bucharest Municipality.

8) Claiming that the Romanian state should finance parochial schools and should train Hungarian-language specialists in state higher education.

9) Ostentatiously playing the Hungarian national anthem and displaying the flag with the Hungarian national colors.

10) The refusal of the UDMR parliamentarians to take an oath of loyalty to Romania. The taking of an oath [of loyalty] to Hungary in the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Cluj-Napoca, an event at which the Hungarian national anthem was played.

11) Maintaining an anti-Romanian campaign in the Hungarian-language press in Romania and abroad, with the scandalous support of irredentist circles in Hungary and in some Western European countries and in America, including the World Union of Hungarians, the International Committee for Transylvania, the Soros Foundation, etc.

12) Repeatedly inviting to Romania, in a provocative manner, persons known for their anti-Romanian, irredentist attitudes, such as Istvan Csurka from Hungary and Eva Maria Barki from Austria, who was declared "persona non grata" in 1994 by the Romanian authorities for her provocative public statements against the Romanian authorities and for insulting the dignity of the Romanian people.

13) Transforming Hungarian-language broadcasts of Romanian Television into political broadcasts of the UDMR, which are hostile to Romania and the Romanian people; continually inciting the population of Hungarian nationality in Romania to act against law and order and to engage in civil disobedience, with the use of outrageous propaganda materials that have been fraudulently brought into Romania and disseminated.

14) Denigrating Romania, disputing the facts in regard to the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania in all international organizations of which Romania is a member, and creating an artificial atmosphere of lack of confidence in the legitimate authorities of the Romanian state.

15) Insulting the Romanian Army by the statements of certain UDMR leaders who brazenly contest the army's right to carry out military exercises on the territory of certain counties in Transylvania.

16) Sponsoring illegal trafficking in weapons, many of which were found by Romanian state organs—an activity that was described in detail in the 1994 report of the Romanian Intelligence Service, which was presented to the Romanian Parliament.

17) The obsessive presence of the majority of the UDMR parliamentarians on the lists of signatures calling for the suspension of the president of Romania and the resignation of the government that came into power as a result of the democratic elections of September 1992.

18) Boycotting Romania's National Day, 1 December, and not recognizing the 1919 peace treaty of Trianon.

19) Opposing political, cultural and religious events, such as the inauguration of the Orthodox diocese of Miercurea Ciuc, in regions inhabited both by citizens of Romanian nationality and by those belonging to the Hungarian minority, and formulating statements condemning such events, in the belief that they were directed against Hungarians in Romania.

20) Profaning the cemetery in Valea Uzului where about 130 Romanian soldiers who died for the integration of the Fatherland during World War I are buried.

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21) Preventing (by means that included street disturbances) architectural excavations in Cluj-Napoca intended to reveal new evidence of the continuity of the Romanian people in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area.

22) Defending, before public opinion in the country and abroad, sadistic criminals who, in December 1989, savagely killed innocent people merely because they were of Romanian nationality, and presenting these criminals as "heroes of the revolution" on the basis of ethnic criteria.

23) The presence on a regular basis of UDMR parliamentarians and leaders in Budapest; their access to the government, parliament and presidency of the neighboring country, under the pretext of the "unitary coordination" of the activity of Hungarian minority organizations in the countries located in the vicinity of Hungary.

24) Perseveringly promoting ideas about the territorial disintegration of Romania by supporting the membership of counties in the western part of the country in the so-called Euro-Carpathian region.

25) Oppressing Romanian citizens—especially intellectuals—in Covasna and Harghita counties.

26) Contesting the right of the Romanian Government to appoint prefects of Romanian nationality in Covasna and Harghita counties and inciting UDMR representatives in local organs of public administration to boycott their activity.

27) Enclaving and isolating the Romanian counties of Harghita and Covasna with a view to the improper declaration of autonomy of the so-called Land of the Szeklers, using all methods, including casting Romanians into unemployment and starvation (e.g., the case of the big enterprise in Sfintu Gheorghe at which 1,500 Romanians were fired recently.)

28) Maintaining territorial and ethnic autonomy in areas with a population from the Hungarian minority in Romania, with the final goal being the territorial dismemberment of Romania.

29) Organizing paramilitary groups on the territory—on the streets and in the wards, villages, communes, and cities—waiting for the opportune moment.

30) Attempting to assassinate the chairman of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] [Gheorghe Funar] in Timisoara during the 1992 election campaign, and the continuing denigration of Romanian patriots and of Romanian citizens belonging to the Hungarian minority who have publicly expressed disapproval of the activity of the UDMR and who are working for the peaceful coexistence of the majority population in Romania with the national minorities and for the respecting of the Romanian Constitution.

31) Refusing to participate in the activity of the Council for National Minorities in Romania.

32) Using churches to carry out political activities of an anti-Romanian nature.

33) Illegally assuming the right to be considered the only representative of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

34) Printing and disseminating in the schools brochures and books falsifying the history of Romania, which are used as textbooks for the teaching of history by teachers in educational units in which Hungarian is the language of instruction.

35) Instituting a "miniparliament," called the "Council of UDMR Representatives." and the "Council of UDMR Mayors and Councillors," legislative and executive bodies that are substitutes for the Romanian Parliament and Government in Harghita and Covasna counties.

36) Maintaining, night and day, for five years, a climate of suspicion, arrogance and terror, and of humiliation of the Romanians in Transylvania—who, in some places, cannot even buy bread and medicines if they do not speak Hungarianm and who are greeted with shouts such as the following, on the streets: "Monkeys, get out of Transylvania"; "Vlachs, you stink"; and "Transylvania to Hungary."

These are only a few of the illegal actions of the UDMR, which were exposed and condemned in due time by the Greater Romania Party [PRM]. This is why we are drawing the attention of domestic and international public opinion to the dangerous nature of this shock force, which, if it is not banned immediately, could endanger not only peace in Romania but also the stability of the European continent. Our party firmly supports the defense of democratic values, the protection of all minorities, the integration of Romania into the political-diplomatic, economic, banking, cultural-scientifife and military structures of the civilized world. But, in order to achieve this goal, there must be real stability in this area of the world. Therefore, the PRM is making a resolute appeal for the application of the laws of the country, in accordance with the international norms on the basis of which they have been applied in more or less similar situations in countries such as the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain and Spain, which have nipped in the bud all terrorist organizations.

[Signed] The Steering Committee of the PRM: PRM chairman Corneliu Vadim Tudor, senator from Bucharest, secretary of the Senate of Romania; (reserves) Lieutenant General Valeriu Buzea, deputy chairman; (reserves) Colonel Dr. Ioan Marinescu, deputy chairman, deputy from Bucharest; Mircea Hamza, deputy chairman; (reserves) Colonel Ioan Tanasa, deputy chairman, deputy from Cluj; Furo Ioan Iuliu, executive secretary, deputy from Bucharest; Corneliu Ciontu, executive secretary; university professor and engineer Dr. Anghel Stanciu, executive secretary, deputy from Iasi; Mitzura Arghezi, executive secretary; university lecturer and (reserves) Major General Dr. Traian

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Bandila, executive secretary; Dan Ioan Mirescu, executive secretary; university professor and engineer Adrian Moisoiu, member; economist Mircea Purceld, member.

Ceausescu's Birthday Marked at Grave, in Press

95P20520A

[FBIS Media Note] To mark the 77th birthday of Nicolae Ceausescu, the former Romanian Communist Party [RCP] general secretary and president of Romania who was executed, together with his wife Elena, during the December 1989 Revolution, the 25 January-7 February issue of the Bucharest paper EUROPA—according to its masthead, "an independent publication of national opinion"—featured a large photograph of Ceausescu and an article on its front page. According to the article, "Ceausescu represented the hope for the rebirth of the Romanians through their own efforts...even if the efforts were sometimes beyond our strength. Compared to what is (or is not) happening today, they seem to have been justified.... His death proves, once again, that the great leaders of the Romanians have had a tragic fate."

The Bucharest daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI of 27 January reported that, like every year, "persons nostalgic for the old regime, curiosity-seekers, and representatives of the media" visited the Ceausescu grave in Ghencea cemetery on 26 January. According to the paper, hundreds came, bringing flowers and candles. There was a cross with a "portrait" of Ceausescu and banners with slogans such as: "Eternal Honor to the Great Hero, the Martyr of Socialist Romania" and five "rather shabby" wreaths, including one from the RCP. The paper noted that the Ghencea cemetery priests "refused to officiate at a memorial service for the former communist leader."

According to EVENIMENTUL ZILEI, the visitors to the grave discussed "'burning' issues related to the transition to democracy—unemployment, low wages, reduced pensions, and lack of housing—as well as the everyday concerns of the average Romanian, and they mourned Ceausescu." One person said: "All we got after the revolution was freedom of speech. But that does not put weight on you or keep you from getting hungry." Another said: "During Ceausescu's time, if you could not buy meat, at least you could eat potatoes or vegetables. Now this has become a luxury." The paper noted that even the "monstrous acts of the former dictator," such as the destruction of churches and of historical buildings, "found supporters," one of whom said: "Bucharest had to be demolished because it was full of squalor and rats." EVENIMENTUL ZILEI noted that copies of the "new version of the RCP paper SCINTEIA" were being sold at the entrance to the cemetery.

According to the youth daily TINERETUL LIBER of 27 January, the Ceausescus' daughter, Zoe, visited her parents' grave on the morning of 26 January and left a bouquet of flowers. One group of visitors "sang the 'Internationale' with great emotion," and Professor Gheorghe Ungureanu, deputy chairman of the Romanian Socialist Party, "a phantom group which has no connection with Tudor Mohora's [Socialist] Party," proposed that 26 January be proclaimed "National Dignity Day."

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Turkish Ambassador Addresses B-H Assembly

AU2702220895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1507 GMT on 27 February carried a live relay of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly session at which Turkish Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina Sukru Tufan reads the speech with which Turkish President Demirel, who could not arrive in Sarajevo due to security reasons, was supposed to greet the deputies. The address is in English, with a superimposed translation read by the correspondent from the Assembly, Senada Cumurovic.

First, Ambassador Tufan greets Bosnia-Herzegovina President Izetbegovic and the deputies and conveys "the warmest greetings of the Turkish people to all heroic people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and all of Sarajevo." Tufan draws a parallel between the Republic of Turkey "which constituted itself through the self-sacrifice of the people" and their "courageous struggle for liberation" and Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The blood of the women and children of our brotherly Bosnian nation spilt will be a black mark in the history of mankind," Ambassador Tufan says and reminds that "the Turkish people supported the struggle for justice from the very beginning."

"The disintegration that took place in this part of the Balkans three years ago was not brought about by anyone's pressure. Yugoslavia disintegrated by itself," Ambassador Tufan says, "and as a result of the country's disintegration, independent states emerged, which Turkey was one of the first to recognize." Because of the ties and "responsibility stemming from history," Turkey embraced Bosnia on the first day it gained its independence, Tufan says, and helped it be accepted by the international community and gain its seat in the United Nations.

Although UN principles guarantee all its members "respect, territorial integrity, and the sovereignty of borders," the Turkish ambassador continues, this principle was not implemented in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was attacked in the process of its constitution. "The arms embargo completely tied the hands of the Bosniak people. While on one side the enemy, armed with the Yugoslav weapons, stepped up his attacks, on the other side stood the innocent Bosniak people, condemned to the fate of disappearing from the annals of history." For this reason, he says, Turkey supports Bosnia-Herzegovina and "condemns the incapacity of the international community to stand up against genocide."

"The inertia of the international community toward the games that are being played with in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not merely harm the Bosnia-Herzegovina people," but also tarnishes the reputation and credibility of international organizations, primarily the United Nations. "Countless decision that were not implemented set a very bad example and encouraged the attackers to commit shameful acts," Tufan says. "The international community failed the test in the moment when it was given the task of introducing order in the new world," Ambassador Tufan says.

"Turkey believes that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation represents the basis for a peaceful solution of the problem. The fact that the Federation is also open for the entry of the Bosnian Serbs best illustrates its character, as a cultural, multiethnic, multireligious, and civic republic. For this reason, we ascribe great importance to its further strengthening," Ambassador Tufan says.

"Only a little time is left until the expiry of the cease-fire. The search for a peaceful solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina has reached an important level. We must all make efforts to avoid the repetition of bloodshed," he urges, saying that "the Western Contact Group bears great responsibility in this respect." "From the very beginning, Turkey was adamantly opposed to the ideas based on division on national and ethnic principles," the ambassador says, adding that Turkey has always preferred "mutual respect and cooperation in place of national and religious cantons."

"Speaking in this house, I would like to address your and our neighbor—Yugoslavia. Turkey is opposed to bloodshed, [words indistinct] who are against this. [Words indistinct] we wish that only peace, security, and mutual trade thrive on these territories. For this reason, we expect Yugoslavia's assistance and call on Yugoslavia to respond to the call of duty in the impending difficult period and prevent further bloodshed. It can only benefit in return. Let me repeat, the solutions that will be found for the borders and the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not merely concern Bosnia-Herzegovina. The problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of [words indistinct] at the beginning of the creation of the new world. A feeling of despair [word indistinct] and surroundings is inevitable. In the times when the world is uniting and the borders exist as (?lines on the map), in Bosnia-Herzegovina exist [words indistinct] in the Balkans, and creation of blocs and groups out of sync with our times," Ambassador Tufan says.

"As a representative of the people who love parliamentary and multiparty democracy and who believe that, even in the most difficult of conditions, one should seek a solution within the boundaries of democracy," Ambassador Tufan concludes, "I believe that success is inevitable as long as we work in the knowledge that democracy is a struggle for humanity and uprightness."

Izetbegovic Assesses Successes, Failures

AU2702181295 Sarajevo BOSNJACKI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 94 p 3

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic by Ada Campara; place and date not given: "That Is a Bomb That Ought To Be Handled Carefully"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] If there is a competent person with whom to discuss the results achieved so far in the defense of our country and its future, then it is Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic and the man who is considered to be the heart and main strategist of all the successes so far. We discussed with him the basic elements of our people's survival. We asked him to sum up what has been accomplished so far.

[Campara] Mr. President, after almost three years of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, could you make a strategic assessment regarding the spheres in which we, as a people and a state, have achieved an historic result, and those in which we have lost or could have done more?

[Izetbegovic] I will certainly not be saying anything new if I say that our greatest accomplishment is the defense of our country. The growth of our armed forces is quite impressive, indeed. The number of armed defenders of Bosnia grew from the initial 18,000 people to 50,000 by the end of the first year, and it doubled in every subsequent year. By the end of 1993, the number amounted to over 100,000, while by the end of 1994 we had more than 200,000 soldiers. We successfully dealt with sometimes unsolvable logistical problems that such a rapid development of the army posed. We were supposed to provide food and clothes and to train and arm the constantly growing number of soldiers. There was a period in the war when such difficult tasks were performed under the conditions of a total blockade. Of course, I refer to the period of the conflict between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] that lasted for more than a year in some critical parts of the country.

One should also include among our major successes the establishment and preservation of the democratic character of the state authorities and the promotion of Bosnia and its case throughout the world, which we achieved with a relatively small number of people and scarce resources.

More Persistence

Our failures—or rather minor successes—are to be found in the sphere of the economy, currency, salaries, pensions and refugees. The state is based on voluntary work, because of which the drain of the productive force continues. Pensions are without any value; we are not in control of firms; the proprietary and housing reforms are stagnating; while the bulk of our refugees abroad are losing the spiritual connection with the homeland because of the media blockade, and so forth. In that respect, we could have done more by launching a satellite TV or more intense radio broadcasts for our refugees. We have obviously missed doing some things.

Of course, there remains the question of the objective limitations here, because the difficulties are really huge. Nevertheless, we Bosnians have showed that we can do miracles if we concentrate on a particular issue. Which is to say, we ought to identify the problem and persevere in solving it. I am not sure that we have shown the same degree of persistence in dealing with each of those problems.

[Campara] One gets the impression that the four month cease-fire is a sort of timeout for some international factors in the struggle for peace, while some want to maintain the current situation of parceling Bosnia out. How do you view that tendency and the various scenarios coming from abroad, and can we defeat them by our own forces and force them to accept a just settlement? To what extent does this depend on the possible lifting of the arms embargo or a UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] withdrawal from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Izetbegovic] When speaking about the international factors, both tendencies are quite apparent. Of course, the one that wants to settle the Bosnian problem in a short time and at any price, which means at our disadvantage, is certainly the most dangerous. We keep a close eye on that tendency, and I think that our efforts to withstand it can be noticed. Our general military and political situation was very difficult in November last year, at the time of the Serbian offensive against Bihac. Those were very difficult times. Since then, and thanks primarily to the successful resistance offered by the 5th Corps, which succeeded in defending Bihac, as well as to our decisive diplomatic action in the United States, Europe, and Russia, the situation has improved, so that the political position of Bosnia-Herzegovina has stabilized and is quite favorable at the moment. As for the possible lifting of the arms embargo, it is a rather strong card that we are not giving up, but it is also a bomb that ought to be handled with care.

[Campara] How do you feel about the current initiatives regarding new conferences on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and how will you feel personally, if the conditions for that are created, in the direct negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic?

[Izetbegovic] The chances that the meeting to which you refer will come about are rather small. Yet, if it does, that will be our victory. I do not see any reason why I should feel bad as the victor.

Patient Work Remains

[Campara] Although there are some positive trends, at least on the declarative level, the problems regarding the Federation must not be minimized. Do you believe in its perspective, and since the fact that certain structures in Zagreb and Grude are obstructing the process cannot be questioned at all, have we made any errors?

[Izetbegovic] The implementation of the Federation is really not going well. We issued the Promemoria [as published], in which we stated our views on the problem quite explicitly. It is a profound analysis of the causes and difficulties that obstruct the implementation of the

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Washington Agreement. Our goal was, and we said that explicitly, to encourage the Croatian side to work out a similar analysis, from its own angle. I expected them to do so, and I was quite anxious to see what they would say. Yet, nothing has happened so far. They keep on making abstract, general remarks, while what we want is a concrete discourse, because only in such a way can the problems be solved. Now we have the decisions from Munich. We shall choose an arbiter, who will probably be German or American, so we expect that the elimination of the difficulties will speed up. There is apparently pressure being exerted by the international community to the Federation's advantage, which means it is a positive, rather than a negative pressure, but there is also a lack of new ideas. What remains is for us to keep on working patiently, and hope for the best.

[Campara] Due to the relative cease-fire, the heart of the fight for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition to the strengthening of the internal forces, is being transferred more and more to the diplomatic sphere. How do you see the tasks of our country and our diplomatic corps in such circumstances, and how do you interpret the results of the prime minister's visits to the United States and Russia in terms of the strengthening of our positions?

[Izetbegovic] It is better to solve problems by political, diplomatic means, rather than by military means, if that is possible at all. The results of Prime Minister Silajdzic's visits to the United States and Russia are good, even very good, speaking in terms of the current circumstances. However, there is a condition, or rather a fact, that our position abroad will always depend on our position at home.

That relation, even if it is disturbed for a moment, always restores and reconfirms itself. To be more concrete, this means that our general political position will always depend on our military position; that is, our strength will decide the final outcome.

That is to say, our fate will be decided in Bosnia, rather than in the United States or Russia, despite all the specific factors that I do not deny.

[Box, p 3]

[Campara] The events on the Bosnian political and economic stage seem to be gaining momentum. How do you view the current confrontation of views regarding the ideologization of the armed forces, the criticisms regarding the method of work of the Presidency that you head, and finally, the ever louder criticisms by the opposition that most frequently refer to the Presidency, rather than to the government? What is the democratic quality of those criticisms, and what could be lost?

[Izetbegovic] You have picked the right word when you said that events are gaining in momentum. The same thought has been following me these days. The problem is the results. When you are strong, even blows make you stronger. And we are strong, so the latest polemics in the Presidency has been quite useful for us. They have initiated some processes and cleared up certain things. The people have started to deliberately or undeliberately mix up ideas, that is, to mix up means and goals.

Our goal, under any sort of conditions, remains to be an integral and democratic Bosnia. Someone has made, quite rightfully and adequately, a remark that, for instance, the 7th Muslim Brigade has contributed more to the preservation of a civil Bosnia than all the self-proclaimed and vociferous democrats who sit at home and only talk about Bosnia. Why would "salaam" jeopardize democracy? It calls for peace. Who is bothered by that, and what kind of ideologization is that?

In Bosnia, the kind of Bosnia we are fighting for, nobody will be forced to believe or not believe in God, or be persecuted because of his or her religion, nation, or political conviction. If I were asked for my opinion, I would put those two words in the preamble of our future constitution.

As for criticism, it is like medicine, unpleasant but useful. After all, only the weak are afraid of criticism, while we are strong.

Silajdzic: Contact Group Plan Rewards 'Genocide'

AU2802110795 Munich FOCUS in German 25 Feb 95 p 234

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Nigel Rahimpour; place and date not given: "'Just Count the Graves!'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Rahimpour] The international community of states is courting Serbian President Milosevic while, at the same time, asking for more flexibility from your side. Will you finally have to accept less than 51 percent?

[Silajdzic] Never. Even the current partition plan rewards those who have committed genocide. For the sake of peace we have accepted this unfair proposal. Whenever the Serbs have rejected a solution, the international community of states has offered them concessions while, at the same time, increasing pressure on us.

[Rahimpour] How long will the cease-fire last?

[Silajdzic] Let us hope until 1 May. Yet, the most recent Serbian offensive could force us to annul the cease-fire agreement. After all, we cannot stand idly by for ever.

[Rahimpour] What consequences could the UN withdrawal from Croatia have for Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Silajdzic] The United Nations has not helped Bosnia or Croatia. On the contrary: By imposing an international arms embargo, they have deprived us of the right to self-defense. Their presence has only cemented the territories conquered by the Serbs and benefited the regime in Belgrade. It cannot go on like this.

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[Rahimpour] Still, people are tired of the war. How do you intend to motivate them to continue fighting if the Serbs continue to refuse to sign the peace plan?

[Silajdzic] We are driven by the will to survive. This has been the case for the past three years and will be so in the future, too.

[Rahimpour] The Bosnian-Croatian alliance is crumbling. Will fighting flare up again?

[Silajdzic] There are difficulties. However, so far we are not facing a new war yet. The biggest problem is that we have been asked to build the Federation with people who are responsible for the establishment of concentration camps, for example. Only when these people lose office will the alliance have a future.

[Rahimpour] In Sarajevo there is also a growing trend toward national separatism and religion is gaining ground. Will Bosnia become an Islamic state?

[Silajdzic] Bosnia will certainly not become a fascist state. After all, this is what we are fighting against. Nobody need be afraid of the Bosnian Muslims, because Bosnia is a democracy. Yet, our home has changed. It is no longer the same multicultural state. Just count the graves in the cemeteries and then you will realize who has defended this country.

[Rahimpour] Many have complained that the top positions in Sarajevo are only filled with Muslims now. Those who do not have a Muslim family name have difficulties finding a job. Croats and Serbs are being driven out of their apartments, although not systematically....

[Silajdzic] Some 200,000 Bosnians had to die because they did not have the right name. We are talking of survival and you of multicultural coexistence. Ninety-nine percent of the people who defend Bosnia are Muslims. This is bound to bring changes. The mosques are full now. So you must not expect the same Bosnia-Herzegovina that you knew from before the war. This would be unnatural. After all, we are not living in heaven but on earth.

Delic Says Political Will Needed for Joint Army

AU2702202495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is better prepared than it was two months ago when it had the upper hand on the Bosnia-Herzegovina front, General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff, stated for B-H PRESS. Once the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency concludes and informs the international community that the [cease-fire] agreement is no longer valid, the Army will be ready to help strengthen via force a process that will lead toward peace and agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the agreement is not honored in Bihac, then the Army will, by a decision of the state presidency, help stabilize the situation in that area in the best possible manner.

When asked what military implications the withdrawal of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] troops from Croatia will have for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gen. Delic said:

I do not believe that UNPROFOR will leave the Republic of Croatia. It seems that the Croatian authorities are trying to change UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia, and this would be very significant for the change of UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bearing in mind that the same mistakes were made in its implementation. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is also ready for the bleakest option, which would ensue with a possible withdrawal of the peace troops. It is hard to foresee whether this process will also imply the escalation of clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and naturally the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] to an extent to which it wants to, has the strength to resolve the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina parallel to everything that the international community is obliged to do, primarily to lift the arms embargo.

Looking at the organization of the unified army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and contribution that the General Staff of the U.S. Army can make here, Gen. Delic said:

The arrival of U.S. generals who are supposed to help constitute the Federation's Army has been announced. There are realistic chances for this, which is confirmed by the cessation of hostilities and joint operations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO. However, it is an entirely different question whether a political will for this exists. A country cannot have two armies, and I believe that the present situation will continue until a political consensus for a unified army is reached.

When asked whether he is satisfied as the General Staff commander with the manner in which he government is resolving the problems of the soldiers' status, Gen. Delic said:

Measures that would resolve the issue of soldiers' status still have not been undertaken. The Slavinovici case has once again demonstrated the state's unwillingness to tackle certain problems. When I say this, I am referring to numerous open issues in housing policy, mobilization, compulsory work order, and so forth. Certain moves were made—however, not to an extent that would satisfy me, Gen. Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, said for B-H PRESS.

Delic Calls For Firmer Stand on UNPROFOR

AU2702134495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1010 GMT 27 Feb 95

[Speech by Army General Rasim Delic, chief of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo on 27 February—live]

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[FBIS Translated Text] There has been a lot said here about the [cease-fire] agreement, but I would like to remind you that the 31 December agreement was preceded by the 23 December cease-fire agreement, and only then came the 31 December agreement on the cessation of hostilities.

During the talks on both these agreements, I insisted as a soldier on those issues that I assessed as disputed, as issues that will remain disputed, and time has shown that they are disputed, that they will not be complied with. The condition that I mentioned also to Mr. Akashi and Generals de Lapresle and Rose was that we could enter into agreements but Bihac and the solution to the situation in Bihac had to be resolved, as well as the humanitarian roads since we cannot allow our people to die of starvation if not of bullets.

The most important thing, I think, and something that we need to define here is that the 31 December agreement and then the document that verified some things from that agreement—the document of 11 January that the commanders and Gen. Rose signed—clearly defines the duties of not only the Serbian aggressor but also of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in solving these problems. Mr. Akashi personally took responsibility; when I asked him, and I did so on several occasions, who would guarantee the withdrawal of foreign troops, who would guarantee that the cease-fire holds in Bihac, he said literally that he was the one who would guarantee that. Ever since that he has not been seen in this region; he has not been around at all. I think that he should finally be called upon to answer why he is not meeting his obligations. The 11 January document literally specifies that by 14 January at the latest the road across the airport should be opened, without any limitations, and that all the other roads should be discussed, the roads to Srebrenica, Zepa, and Bihac, since that was our condition for signing the agreement. None of this has happened. Also by 14 January at the latest the central joint commission, and the regional commission in Bihac was supposed to draw up a plan for the withdrawal of foreign troops [Croatian Serbs] from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This has not happened either.

I, as a soldier, respect what the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency is doing in this respect. However, we now have a clear picture of the reasons why the aggressor entered the agreement. The aggressor entered the agreement primarily to consolidate his own ranks, to freeze the lines where he wants to, since he was so stretched that he could not longer endure, and then to concentrate all the troops on the Bihac region. On 26 January the decision was made in the General Staff in Belgrade to launch an offensive on Bihac as the continuation of the autumn offensive. Troops were brought in and the offensive was launched. But militarily they cannot do anything significant. These are questions of principle, and our principled compliance [with the cease-fire] is in contrast to the lack of reaction by the UNPROFOR and the international community, which took certain obligations upon itself.

As soldiers, we are put in a position, I as the commander am put in a position to have to explain to people, soldiers, and units, why we are respecting the agreement when the other side is not doing so at all. I have said this to Gen. Smith. I think that these various meetings are meant to muddle the real situation and trick the public into thinking that something is being done. I have another invitation for 2 March to meet Mladic and Gen. Smith, but nothing new is on offer. Are we again to discuss what we have already defined?

I think that here we should determine the principles, the ways to conduct such talks and negotiations, and finally get UNPROFOR to stop being a mediator, particularly on such issues where it has clear duties. This is no longer a mediating issue. UNPROFOR has the duty to remove the foreign troops from the territory of Bihac and to deploy itself along Bosnia-Herzegovina's borders. Since the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is ready to respond to the attacks it has come under both in Bihac and [changes thought] I warned Gen. Smith that we would not bow our heads there and receive blows. He asked me why we were attacking. Because that is our way of conducting warfare. We do not always have to wait to be attacked first in order to defend ourselves. Attack is also a form of defense. We are fighting a war on our terrain and naturally we are choosing ways for the most effective prosecution of this war. We are principled in asking for full compliance with everything that has been agreed, because there would then be no need for the 5th Corps to fight, since UNPROFOR would then be along the borders between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. In that respect I propose that this session issues a clear warning to the international community that we will not take this any more. We will not take this any more, this disrespect of everything. We have fully complied with the only obligation that we had according to that agreement, and that is to allow control of the demilitarized zone of Igman and Bjelasnica even with the use of helicopters, and landing in certain areas—in 12 or 13 points—in a joint commission with the aggressor. They can see that we are no longer there.

On the other hand, and at the same time, they entered the demilitarized zone of Srebrenica. The aggressors captured one facility and, when we warned UNPROFOR to get them removed, there was no reaction. When we tried to remove them, UNPROFOR forbade us from going to the area. This is an example of the double standards used by certain units of UNPROFOR, which simply implement the policies of their countries. We must have clear methods of cooperation with UNPROFOR and clear demands for them; we must be firmer with them. I repeat, we need direction in that respect. We should not allow any part of our territory to be captured because we are fully complying with something that no one else is. We have to ask for full

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compliance from everyone. We have to present it more in the media; we should demand that the international community and UNPROFOR here say a few words, to say publicly who is not complying with the agreement. We have not had any such statements from them yet.

Thank you.

UN: Missile Radar Locked on German Plane

AU2702160095 Paris AFP in English 1516 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 27 (AFP)—A German plane, lifting off from Sarajevo airport, was threatened by a missile radar lock-on Monday morning and there were several shooting incidents at the airport, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) said.

The incidents—along with shooting in Sarajevo itself—came on the day Turkish President Suleyman Demirel was to have flown in to Sarajevo. His trip to the Bosnian capital was called off at the last minute early Monday because of fears the Serbs might fire at his aircraft, the UN said.

Instead, Demirel flew from Split, on the Adriatic coast, to Zenica, central Bosnia, to review the 1,500 Turkish blue helmets deployed there. But Demirel said he would try again to get into Sarajevo. Sarajevo radio quoted him as saying that "after our visit to Zenica, we'll go back to Split and try again to enter Sarajevo."

But Monday afternoon the Turkish Embassy here said they no longer thought he would be arriving. The Turkish ambassador had gone to parliament to deliver a speech which the president was originally to have made.

Meanwhile, UNPROFOR spokesman Major Herve Gourmelon said a German-manned C-160 aircraft reported a radar lock-on by a ground-to-air missile battery, to the west of Sarajevo shortly after take-off Monday morning. Instrument checks were to be carried out to confirm the lock-on, which is considered a threat in military terms.

At least three shooting incidents took place at the airport with Serbs firing into the air as aircraft approached, Gourmelon also said. None of the planes reported any hits. French Foreign Legion soldiers, serving with the UN and deployed at the airport, fired back warning shots.

Meanwhile, five people were injured by sniper fire, one seriously, while travelling on a tram car in central Sarajevo Monday morning. A 57-year-old woman was killed in the suburb of Hrasnica Sunday night, Gourmelon also reported. Initial reports said she was hit by mortar shrapnel. And one rocket-propelled grenade exploded in Dobrinja in the western part of Sarajevo, near the airport, Monday morning, causing no injuries. Two teenage boys were wounded by sniper fire in the same area Sunday afternoon.

Document Outlines Aims of Herceg-Bosna

LD2602190195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1811 GMT 26 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] New York, 26 Feb (SRNA)—HRVATSKI GLAS [Croatian Voice], a paper appearing in middle America [as received], recently published an internal document of the Presidential Council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna [CRHB], which outlined the main strategic directions of its future development.

The document, entitled "Guidelines for the Political and Military Organization of the CRHB," envisages two stages in its implementation—"federal and independent."

The first concerns the insistence of Croat bodies on, it says, "the finalization of Croat municipalities and their incorporation into the mother [Bosnian Croat] republic, the creation of new commands of the Croat Defense Council, and the ultimate achievement of 50 percent parity in the legislative and executive bodies of the federation."

This should only be a preparation for the proclamation of the independence of the CRHB and its annexation to the Republic of Croatia, although the deadline for this stage has not been fixed and will depend on the final military and political denouncement on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The CRHB Presidential Council assesses in its document, adopted at the 17 February session in Mostar, when the mandates of its members were ratified, that in their definitive military and political demarcation with the Serbs and Muslims, the Croat people must maintain their strategic national interests at all costs.

Details of this document have not been published in CRHB papers, but this was not the first time Croat policymakers wished to make their fundamental objectives known to the diaspora first.

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Tudjman Airs Views on UNPROFOR Issue

LD2702194295 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 95

[Statement by President Franjo Tudjman at news conference following talks with Turkish President Suleyman Demirel in Zagreb on 27 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] During today's talks, which lasted over one hour, President Demirel and I discussed the general situation in former Yugoslavia and in the Balkans. We focused on the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the problem of the occupied territories in Croatia, especially with a view to Croatia's decision to cancel the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate.

I explained to President Demirel that in cancelling the UNPROFOR mandate, Croatia does not want to resolve the problem of the occupied territories by means of war, but we want the cancellation to speed up a peaceful resolution.

War does not mean cancellation of UNPROFOR, but the threat of war means the prolongation of the occupation of Croatian territories [sentence as heard].

President Demirel showed understanding for Croatia's viewpoint and we will have his support and Turkey's support in Croatia's efforts to continue, and speed up, the process of reaching a peaceful solution, and he showed understanding for the fact that Croatia is offering, in some sense, the presence of the international community for the purpose of ensuring a peaceful solution. For example, we would probably agree to enter into a new agreement with the international community—not the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate. This new agreement might mean that some special international units are deployed on the border between Croatia and Serbia, and the current observers could have some task along the lines of finding out who is in favor of a peaceful solution and who is in favor of provoking war. In this sense there is a great overlap between the viewpoints of President Demirel and myself.

Naturally, we considered the problem of the resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we agreed that this is objectively one of the most complex problems in the world and that everything should be done, with lots of rationality and lots of patience, so that a peaceful solution—and not the prolongation of the war—can be reached here too.

As President Demirel said, I have accepted his invitation to visit Ankara—at least in a working sense—so that we might consider not only international problems but also bilateral relations between Croatia and Turkey, where we intend to cooperate in all economic and other areas which hitherto have been very fruitful.

One more sentence. I said the cancellation of UNPROFOR's mandate does not mean war, but the prolongation of the occupation of Croatia under the current UNPROFOR mandate would mean war because Croatia cannot tolerate occupation. And Croatia, if all Croatia's efforts to reach a peaceful solution with the help of the international community turn out to be in vain, then of course Croatia will be prepared to use all means in order to resolve the problem of the occupied areas. However, even after the departure of UNPROFOR, in the coming six months, we will continue our efforts to reach a peaceful solution with the help of the international community.

Tudjman Envoy Confirms Policy on UNPROFOR

AU2702143695 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 95 pp 5-6

[Interview with Miomir Zuzul, ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and special envoy of the president, by Tihomir Dujmovic; place and date not given: "UN Protection Force Cannot Be Considered a Compromise"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The final results of the very tumultuous activity of the international community, of talks, lobbying, and proposals made by international diplomacy will be known soon. Approaching decisions seem to announce an end to the tortures through which the Croatian state has gone. We talked with Mr. Miomir Zuzul, the Croatian ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva and a special envoy of the president of the Republic, about what is going on within these diplomatic games.

[Dujmovic] A high-ranking official of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently announced the possibility that the mandate of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] might be changed, which means that the UNPROFOR would remain in Croatia with changed powers. Is this certain, and to what degree is the change of the mandate acceptable for Croatia?

[Zuzul] It is too early to speak about this now. The international diplomacy presently has three different opinions about the proposal we might offer. The formulation of the statement you are talking about is too concrete, it is based on an opinion of Minister Kinkel and it is not the final official proposal. When I speak about the different opinions now present in the international community, I can say that there are three possible offers. The first one is aimed at deploying forces that would only supervise the cease-fire and implement the economic agreement [with Krajina]. The second one is aimed at deploying forces that would control the borders, and the third one, which comes from the UN seat in New York, is to form something that would not be the UNPROFOR but be still based on UN Security Council resolutions. The powers of these forces, which would be something between observers and the UNPROFOR, are quite unclear. In my opinion, the activities of the international diplomacy are now focused on the Contact Group plan and on a possible meeting of the three

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presidents. Every implementation of any concrete decision could depend on the Paris meeting, which has already been announced.

Agreement Without UNPROFOR

[Dujmovic] If Croatia is offered a good new UNPROFOR mandate, it seems that it would accept it. Croatia has stressed in various statements that only the present UNPROFOR mandate is being canceled, so that there is the impression that Croatia would accept another one.

[Zuzul] I am not sure that this is true, in other words, I do not think that this has been the Croatian intention. Croatia is ready to make a certain agreement with the international community, but a change of the UNPROFOR mandate means that the existing mandate would be redesigned, which is not acceptable for Croatia, because this would not result in any true change. All these offers result from the primary interest of the international community to prevent a new war, this is its primary interest, a possible implementation of a political solution is its second consideration only. Conditionally speaking, we think the other way round; we want the UN Security Council resolutions to be implemented at last, we want the situation the international community has been formally supporting to be established, in other words we want the internationally recognized borders of Croatia to start functioning. Croatia supports negotiations and compromises, but UNPROFOR cannot be considered a compromise we are ready to accept, since the basic orientation of UNPROFOR activities anywhere in the world is not to change the existing situation. It is senseless to polish up or redesign the present UNPROFOR mandate.

[Dujmovic] Savka Dabcevic-Kucar expressed her fear the other day that Milosevic might make it a condition for the recognition of Croatia that it accepts the Z-4 [Zagreb Four] plan. Is this realistic?

[Zuzul] It is not realistic that Belgrade makes the acceptance of the Z-4 plan a condition of that importance. Apart from that, that plan was not offered under the "take it or leave it" condition. In the talks I have had so far, the Z-4 plan has been regularly mentioned, not as a plan with all of its details, however, but as a framework solution. All Croatian reproaches to this plan, which are well known, are not related to the framework but to the elements of the plan. Accordingly, it is possible to say that the recognition of Croatia will be connected to the Z-4 plan, or some other plan, but only as a framework and not to a final and concrete agreement, defined in all of its details.

[Dujmovic] What does the framework mean?

[Zuzul] It means that the integrity and the political sovereignty of Croatia are guaranteed in the whole of its territory, which naturally includes a certain autonomy for the Serbian minority.

[Dujmovic] Will the Serbs not try to interpret the details of that plan to their advantage?

[Zuzul] They will probably try to, but we have clearly set the limits, and the international community knows what these limits are. You can see that the very same international community does not have the mechanisms to force a handful of people in Knin to do anything, so that it cannot be expected that it would want to impose by force a solution opposed by Croatia.

A New Yugoslavia

[Dujmovic] Has Croatia not provoked the elaboration of the Z-4 plan by its laconic attitude that "one can negotiate about everything but not the borders," since the Z-4 seems to prove that "it is the borders that you required"? Has Croatia not made room for Churkin's "state within a state" by that attitude, which is now "served" to us not only by Russia but by the whole internal community!

[Zuzul] Many dangers are hidden below the circumstances in which we act. If you want to avoid them, you have to be unambiguous. Take, for example, the idea of some new Yugoslavia, which is considered the best compromise. This idea is not dead yet, it can still be heard; it is not dominant, but it is still present. The pulse is being felt in order to see how far one can go. It is only natural that we do not want to talk about this idea, because no one in Croatia would accept it today, if someone wanted to implement it by force, this would result in a large-scale war. The danger of a new Yugoslavia should not be overestimated, but it has to be mentioned that there are such ideas. In any case, the best protection from that danger is to insist on our own borders as a political sacredness. Insisting on that attitude implies a solution to other problems, too. If this problem is solved, the question of the Serbian minority will become an internal Croatian matter, and therefore I think that our insistence was correct, I would even say that it was the only possibility.

[Dujmovic] Are the stories that can be heard from time to time about the costs of the UN mission not a cheap excuse for its political inefficiency. The world paid several tens of billions of dollars for Broz's Yugoslavia so that the question of present costs has never been asked.

[Zuzul] I could agree with you. This topic is a kind of excuse, because if their action is too expensive and if these costs are a burden for them, it is a reason to take measures that will bear fruit.

State of Balance

[Dujmovic] For weeks Croatia claimed that it had the support of the world, that it would not take any steps without the consent of the international community (primarily in Bihac), and then it passed the decision to cancel the UNPROFOR, which was not supported by

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anybody, although the envoys of the Croatian president visited the whole world. Why did this happen?

[Zuzul] There are enough reasons. First of all, the international community is happy with any state of balance since it does not expose others to danger. Having UNPROFOR here, the world has someone in this area who will support its comfort, but this requires that for the sake of safety and sound sleep nothing is changed, regardless of how unjust this might be. This means that when you come with a proposal, they immediately assess whether this proposal concerns them or not, how much it will cost them, and to what extent it makes them uncomfortable.

The other reason for such behavior is the fact that the world does not have a model for a long-term solution to the problems in this region yet. When I say "this region," I do not only refer to Croatia. The problem is namely how to establish a new world order. Unfortunately, there are only contours of a new order now, and this is one of the main reasons for the split within the international community. Disturbing a region does not make anybody happy in this situation; this is the reason for their reaction. Now, the international community is expressing its fear regarding our decision because it is afraid that a war between Croatia and Serbia might ignite a longer wick. We have no choice, however. Regardless of the risk, we cannot allow the present situation to last, since it is "fortifying" the occupation. Apart from that, we have our own assessments, which differ from the assessments of some of our friends. In other words we do not believe that it will come to a big war, because it does not suit anybody. It is useful only for a handful of people, for complete lunatics.

A Step Further

[Dujmovic] Why has Croatia not offered its own plan, its own Z-4? Croatian diplomacy only seems to wait for solutions prepared by others. Croatia has not offered anything since the initiative for peace made by the president a long time ago. It is not a coincidence that we get goals because of this passivity.

[Zuzul] Croatia not only accepted the framework of a plan for a solution, it also directed it according to its wishes. We determined the unfolding of events by our constitutional law. This and many other Croatian laws are practically based on decisions taken by the Badinter Commission [EU commission setting out criteria for recognition of breakaway Yugoslav states], which we respect. This is the framework of our solution, and a step further was the initiative for peace taken by the president.

It is true that Croatia has not appeared with an explicit document in the direction of peace since the president's initiative, but the reason is that the contents need not be discussed any longer, at least not in principle, the time for implementation has come, and the implementation of solutions practically depended on the international community. We required from the UNPROFOR, which had all relevant UN Security Council decisions in front of it, that it start the implementation. Three full years have already passed, and they are still turning around in a circle. They have forced us by their behavior to draw certain conclusions; it was not our obstinacy that made us pass the decision to cancel the UN, the UN has provoked this decision by its behavior. As far as Croatian initiatives are concerned, I can say that it can be expected that Croatia soon presents an operational plan without changing the contents of the solution, and this will be a plan for the integration of the UN Protection Areas.

[Dujmovic] Why were our biggest friends, the United States of America and Germany, very sharp in criticizing the Croatian move, it can even be said that—I mean Ambassador Galbraith—they were not very selective in their use of vocabulary.

[Zuzul] No, the words they used were conscientiously selected. Nobody has denied our right to pass such a decision, they only spoke about fears. Their sharp criticism, if it was at all visible, resulted from these fears, and we cannot blame them for this.

In Search of Peace

[Dujmovic] There have been rumors for weeks now that Minister Granic might go to Belgrade. Sometimes it seems that this Ping-Pong is something that hurts the dignity of the Croatian people, because it seems as if we have been begging Belgrade to recognize us. These feelings are especially apparent among refugees.

[Zuzul] These feelings are clear to me, but I can claim with responsibility that all of our decisions are dignified; we have lost nothing of our dignity by having passed them because we have always considered this aspect. We are aware of the fact, however, that a long-term peace can come only if normal relations between Serbia and Croatia are established. These relations need not be brilliant, but they must be normal if we want to achieve peace in this region. We are ready to establish contacts in the search for peace. President Tudjman clearly defined which conditions and which kind of contacts we are ready to accept. If Minister Granic goes to Belgrade, he will go there with the aim of agreeing on concrete steps to be taken to normalize relations and to agree on modalities of mutual recognition. There are people perhaps who consider it insignificant that Croatia is recognized by a state nobody has recognized so far, whereas we have been recognized by the whole world. This is an abstract reproach, however, because the real and concrete establishment of normal relations is necessary if we want to prevent further sacrifices. Apart from that, this recognition would help solve some dilemmas regarding the integration of UN Protected Areas. We are simply doing everything possible to avoid a new conflict, but we cannot recognize the occupation of our territory. Our contacts aimed at achieving recognition lay between these two poles.

[Dujmovic] Since the possible meeting of three presidents in Paris is considered extremely important, can you tell me when this could happen and whether there are some new diplomatic initiatives?

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[Zuzul] If the Paris meeting comes about, it should be held within the next three weeks. Apart from the already well-known elements of that meeting, there are still lobbying, negotiations and agreements that change some of the elements almost every day, so that it would be more productive to wait that the final proposal for that meeting is made. Pressure is now being exerted on Milosevic, because one of the important elements is the mutual recognition [between Serbia and Croatia]. The final outcome of the meeting will depend on it.

UN Claims Army 'Stronger' Than Suggested

AU2702080795 Paris AFP in English 1527 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Topusko, Croatia, Feb 26 (AFP)—United Nations military intelligence sources have concluded that Croatia's army is stronger and better equipped than it suggests to fight a renewed war with Serb separatists, an officer said Sunday [26 February].

Fearing a fresh outbreak of hostilities in the Serb breakaway Krajina region when UN peacekeeping troops withdraw from the area after their mandate ends on March 31, the UN has drawn up estimates of the relative strength of each side.

Croatia has 400 tanks rather than the 200 it admits to, according to a UN military intelligence officer (MIO) based at the spa resort of Topusko in Krajina, and could muster a 220,000-strong army backed by 70,000 armed police.

A war between the Croatian Army and the Krajina Serbs would be like a football match between an experienced professional side (Croatia) and an amateur side with less than a year's coaching (Krajina Serbs), said the officer who asked not to be identified.

Ethnic Serbs controlling Krajina, which represents a quarter of Croatia, hope to gain international recognition for the Serb republic they proclaimed there in 1991 and eventually want to join up with Serbia and Serb-controlled parts of Bosnia.

The Serbs, according to the MIO, can muster about 40,000 soldiers and 200 tanks without the help of their Serb allies in Bosnia and rump Yugoslavia, who might come to their aid. The same UN source said Croatia has at least six Mi-24 combat helicopters and could also get a further 200 tanks despite the international arms embargo placed upon it and the five other former Yugoslav republics since 1991.

Between April 1992 and the same month in 1994, Croatia has bought $600 million worth of defence equipment, according to an international arms trade expert quoted by the independent Croatian bi-monthly ARKZIN.

The UN military intelligence officer said Croatia would not hesitate to use force to regain control of Krajina if it was judged necessary but was counting on the collapse of the area's economy after the UN withdrawal to achieve the same results. He said 60 percent of petrol available in Krajina had come from UN sources on the black market, where a litre of petrol sells for three or four dollars rising to six dollars in times of shortage, and the same was true of food on sale in shops in the "capital" Knin.

However, in the run-up to the withdrawal of 13,000 UN peacekeepers both sides are preparing for war. Colonel Zdislaw Goral, commander of the UN Polish battalion at Slunj, 80 kilometres (50 miles) south of Zagreb in Krajina, said Serbs were strengthening defences along the frontline, digging trenches and laying mines.

A Serb officer at Knin said he was expecting a Croatian attack. The problem was knowing where it would come from. "They know that we are preparing ourselves and we know they are preparing themselves," he said.

Russian Envoy Warns Zagreb of Sanctions

LD2502135995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1247 GMT 25 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 25 (TANJUG)—Russian Ambassador to Zagreb Leonid Kerestedzhiyants has said sanctions could be imposed on Croatia if it attacked the Krajina Serbs.

Saturday's issue of Belgrade daily POLITIKA quoted Kerestedzhiyants as saying that Moscow would vote for sanctions against Croatia in case of an attack.

Kerestedzhiyants said that the regulation of the Knin-Zagreb relations 'could continue only in the presence of the peacekeepers.'

'We can change something in the structure of the force (United Nations Protection Force), but someone should help and guarantee the peace process,' Kerestedzhiyants said. Zagreb in mid-January said it would not extend further hospitality to UNPROFOR after March 31 and would give the 15,000 U.N. troops a three-month deadline to pull out. UNPROFOR has since March 1992 been deployed to preserve peace and separate the warring Croats and Krajina Serbs.

Kerestedzhiyants said it was necessary to 'return to the Vance plan' which, he said, has been accepted by Knin, Belgrade and Zagreb. The Vance plan, signed in early January 1992 by representatives of Belgrade and Zagreb and with agreement by the Krajina Serb leaders, called for UNPROFOR's deployment in the territory of the Republic of Serb Krajina and Croatia. Under the Vance plan, UNPROFOR's mandate was to maintain peace and separate the warring sides until a negotiated agreement between Knin and Zagreb was reached.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian constitution. Although Serb Krajina was declared a U.N. Protected Area

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(UNPA) in March 1992, it has been the target of four major Croatian aggressions aimed at forcefully establishing Croatia's rule there.

POLITIKA quoted Kerestedzhiyants as saying he constantly has to correct those who 'in talks speak about the occuppied areas and the occuppiers.'

'People who have lived here for centuries cannot occupy their own homes and the land of their ancestors,' he said. Zagreb describes Serb Krajina as an occuppied area and calls the Krajina Serbs occupiers although it has stripped them of their status of a constitutive nation.

Krajina 'Will Never Be Part of Croatia'

LD2702173795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1734 GMT 27 Feb 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 27 Feb (SRNA)—Rajko Lezajic, president of the assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] told SRNA today that Krajina would defend itself with all available means if Croatia were to attack it after the Unprofor withdrawal.

"RSK will never be part of Croatia. It can only be reintegrated into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, where it will be together with Serbia, Montenegro, and the Srpska republic, where it used to be before the armed secession of Croatia and Slovenia," Lezajic said. He stressed that the Prijedor declaration adopted in October 1992 had been implemented with the creation of the Srpska republic and RSK Supreme Defense Council.

"Our joint defense is the first step toward the unification of two Serb states west of the river Drina. This will be followed immediately afterwards by the creation of a single Serbian state in the Balkans. We will never give up this goal because this is the objective of our national program, as every Serb knows," Rajko Lezajic concluded.

Mikelic on Resuming Talks With Zagreb

LD2602181995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1541 GMT 26 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Knin, 26 Feb (TANJUG)—The government and the assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] are prepared to resume talks regarding all issues with Croatia as soon as the United Nations adopts a decision on the further status of the peacekeeping troops, RSK Premier Borislav Mikelic told TANJUG today.

Saying that he wants Krajina to remain a UN Protected Area, Mikelic warned against the escalation of "tensions and the establishment of a war option," following Croatia's decision to terminate the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate and the RSK's decision to suspend the negotiating process.

As before, Mikelic says, the situation is being heated up by others from abroad. There is a danger that the present situation could deteriorate, taking Krajina from a peace option to total uncertainty, which can already be felt among the Serb people in Krajina who want the presence of UN troops as a guarantee for the resumption of the negotiating process and the implementation of the economic agreements with Croatia.

The possibility of UNPROFOR remaining in these parts, Mikelic went on to say, was intimated recently by UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi and UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali himself. The U.S. position on the need to have the peacekeepers' mandate extended is also encouraging.

If the world organization is concerned about peace then it and its members should urgently react through its representatives or bodies to reduce war options, not multiply them, Mikelic warned.

Speaking about Croatia's conduct, he said: "I doubt that Croatia, on the eve of its eagerly awaited tourist season and the spring sowing, which is of mutual interest, would wish to return to the situation of 1991."

Concerning the effects of the cease-fire agreements and economic relations with Croatia, the RSK prime minister said: "The progress achieved last year on the peace plane and the visible progress on the economic plane—the opening of the motorway and the oil pipeline—should definitely be maintained and continued where we had broken off."

This visible progress is best illustrated by the functioning of the motorway, Mikelic said, and warned about the fact that "certain politicians outside the RSK are now kindling fires on and around it"; if they continue doing so, we shall notify the public at large, he said. [passage omitted]

UN's Akashi Refused Request To Meet Demirel

TA2702171595 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1600 GMT 27 Feb 95

[Coskun Kartal report from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Suleyman Demirel has left Split and arrived in Zagreb. Demirel arrived in Zagreb at approximately 1530 local time. General Ismail Hakki Karadayi, chief of the General Staff; State Minister Yildirim Aktuna; and Red Crescent director Kemal Demir arrived in Zagreb along with Demirel. Croatian Government officials and the deputy chief of the General Staff received Demirel at Zagreb Airport.

Meanwhile, it was reported that Yasushi Akashi, the special representative of the UN secretary general for former Yugoslavia, undertook initiatives to receive Demirel at Zagreb Airport. This wish was relayed to Demirel; however, Akashi could not receive Demirel because his wish was not granted.

Demirel will visit Croatian President Franjo Tudjman after resting for a while at his hotel.

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Xheferri Briefs EU Envoy on Albanian Repression

AU2502172195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 22 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP] headquarters reports that its chairman Arber Xheferri today held talks with Bob Charcher [name as heard], chairman of the regional center of the Tirana-based European Union [EU] observer mission.

Mr. Xheferri stated that the recent events in Tetovo testify that Macedonian Government repression against Albanians is ongoing. Xheferri also mentioned the violation of Albanians' fundamental rights, such as equal use of language, education, etc.

The so-called democratic parliament is nothing but a government pawn in which the machinery to outvote minority groups rules and the norms of democracy are ignored. The Albanian deputies in this parliament are merely symbolic. This is the reason they decided not to take part in the parliamentary proceedings, PDP representatives told Mr. Charcher.

Albanians Demand Legalization of Banned University

LD2702222495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2204 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 27 Feb (TANJUG)—The Shqiptar [ethnic Albanian] political parties in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] this evening sent a petition to the public and competent institutions in Skopje, as well as to the international community, demanding the legalization of their banned university in Tetovo.

The petition stresses that "education in Albanian at all levels is a basic human right and a vital need of Albanians" and claims that in the FYROM there are tendencies toward "the building of a single-nationality unitary state contrary to the multiethnic reality, something which is intensifying interethnic and political tension and threatening peace and security in the region."

TANJUG has learned from Shqiptar sources in Tetovo that the senate of this university "has found appropriate possibilities for extending tuition." According to the same sources, teaching at the illegal Shqiptar university in Tetovo was organized "in some faculties" today.

The Macedonian political bloc in Tetovo today reacted sharply to yesterday's mass rally of Shqiptars in the village of Mala Recica, where Shqiptar demonstrators clashed with police last week.

University Classes Commence in Private Homes

AU2802111195 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Classes started today at several faculties at Tetovo university. Meanwhile, a petition is being signed by various Albanian political parties and institutions and will be sent to the leading world institutions such as the United Nations, the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the EU. For more details, our correspondent Enver Murati is on the line from Tetovo:

[Murati] Despite the tension and violence committed in Tetovo during recent days in order to prevent classes at Tetovo university, students and teachers of the university started work today at several faculties. Although the classes are being held in private buildings, they will have their proper effect, as there are the will and zeal for education. As of now, we have no reports as to whether the classes have been prevented here or there. We would like to stress that the classes should not be further prevented as this is not a task for the police, but rather of the Education Ministry.

On the other hand, a literary protest event was held last night attended by many poets from various Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] cities and the poet Ganimete Leka from the republic of Kosova. Murat Isaku, Ibrahim Veliu, Resul Shabani, Fejzi Bujku, and many others also presented their work. The literary protest event sent a letter to the PEN Club in London and the Writers League of Macedonia.

On the basis of the policy and decisions taken by the Albanian political parties and institutions and the (?Rightist League) of Albanians in Macedonia, a petition for solidarity against violence was today set up in Tetovo and many other places, which was received with great interest.

Meanwhile, the Tetovo Communal Assembly is to hold a meeting tomorrow, which will again debate the Tetovo university on the basis of the conclusions reached by the Assembly Commission for Education, Culture, and Physical Culture. As we understand it, these conclusions condemn the anticonstitutional and illegal measures undertaken by the Macedonian Interior Ministry against academic professors and other citizens, as well as other communes in Macedonia populated by Albanians.

Albanian Parties Urge Solution to Problems

LD2402185495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1607 GMT 24 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 24 Feb (TANJUG)—Political parties rallying ethnic Albanians in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] have voiced their stance on "the increasing dissatisfaction and concern among the people." They have also issued an appeal for dissatisfaction with the situation in the state to be expressed in a civilized manner.

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At a joint news conference held in Tetovo last night, the parties expressed their views on future activities and efforts aimed at overcoming new problems concerning the opening of the ethnic university, which the Skopje government regards as illegal.

The Party for Democratic Prosperity [Partija demokratskog prosperiteta—PDP], its breakaway Radical-Patriotic wing [Radikalno-otadzbinsko krilo], the National Democratic Party [Narodna demokratska partija], the Party for Democratic Action Islamic Way [Stranka demokratske akcije-Islamski put] and the Alliance of Albanian Women in the FYROM are behind the appeal for a civilized way of expressing dissatisfaction.

The Albanian parties have proclaimed Friday as the day of Pan-Albanian mourning for deceased Abduselem Eminij (33), who died last Friday in clashes between demonstrators and the police in front of the illegal university in the Mala Recica area of Tetovo. [passage omitted]

Bankruptcy Proceedings Affect Unemployment Figures

AU2802101895 Skopje MIC in English 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The total number of employees in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] toward the end of last year was 397,542. This same number was 507,324 in 1990.

On the other hand, last month, the number of non-employed reached 197,968, unlike 1978, when this figure was 100,000. This figure does not include 15,567 people who will lose their jobs with the restructuring of the "losers" over the course of a couple of months.

That is not all, however. The number of unemployed is also increasing on the basis of bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy compensation money of 2,872 denars is being paid to 14,051 workers which is some 3,000 people more only in comparison with December, last year.

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Federal

Contents of Jovanovic Speech to Federal Assembly

AU2402160795 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Feb 95

[Report by Mirajana Protic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic stated in the Federal Assembly that awareness is growing in the international community that the issue of lifting sanctions introduced on the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] is very urgent and topical. Our country remains consistent with the principles of equality and the respect of interests and rights of all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. The deputies in the Committee for Relations With Other Countries in the Yugoslav parliament endorsed the speech by Minister Vladislav Jovanovic. Mirjana Protic reports:

[Protic] The deputies of the Committees for Political and Economic Relations With Other Countries of both chambers of the Federal Assembly were addressed by Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic. Paying full attention, the deputies supported the government and the Federal minister, and the activities of the Federal Government concerning foreign affairs.

During a break in the work of the assembly committees, Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic briefed journalists on the content of his speech in the Federal parliament.

[Jovanovic] We briefed them on Yugoslavia's activities regarding foreign affairs, especially those in connection with the denouement of the Yugoslav crisis. In that respect, our deputies were informed on the basic stands that Yugoslavia has taken in all these contacts, on the stands taken by certain international factors, and on the situation concerning our relations with certain countries, including neighboring countries.

We placed emphasis on the issue of lifting the sanctions, as this is the most topical issue, and the most ripe issue, and the speed of progress in the settlement of other issues greatly depends on the settlement of that issue. Furthermore, we stressed that we firmly stand behind the support that has been extended to the Contact Group's proposal concerning the crisis in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also spoke about the need, in solving these aspects and other problems of the Yugoslav crisis, always to proceed from the equal status and to respect the legitimate interests and rights of all protagonists in that crisis.

We also consider very important, and we stressed that in particular, the fact that Yugoslavia as a country that has contributed most to the strengthening of the peace process so far is finally accepted as an equal partner, and that all elements that question or obstruct that be removed from relations with it.

In this sense, my impression is that we have been met with full understanding and approval of all those present, at least judging by the fact that there were no challenges or special questions. We also stressed the importance of the Greek initiative according to which neighboring countries would appear in the Security Council with a collective demarche regarding the sanctions, and presented what we have achieved so far in our contacts with these countries, since this is obviously an initiative that we are vitally interested in.

At the same time we told members of both committees that we are continuing the practice of regular informal contacts with the main protagonists in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, with the cochairmen, members of the Contact Group, and other individuals or countries that can help or are interested in helping bring peace back to this region, and lift the sanctions.

[Protic] Answering a journalist's question on how realistic the lifting of sanctions was, Minister Jovanovic said.

[Jovanovic] Needs for that are enormous, and not only our needs, but also those of peace, and, I would say, all peace processes. Our impression is that awareness is growing everywhere that this need is great and urgent, and that in our future contacts we will be able to confirm this awareness even more.

[Protic] One of the journalists' questions referred to a possibility of the FRY recognizing Croatia. Minister Jovanovic answered that the Yugoslav Government is not considering that, and categorically stated that no such decisions existed.

If one wants progress in solving problems in the previous Yugoslavia, one must respect the principle of equality in treating all the participants. Yugoslavia remains consistent to its principles set in the past.

Vladislav Jovanovic denied the claims that a Milosevic-Tudjman-Izetbegovic meeting has been arranged. In response to the question on when Croatian Foreign Minister Granic will visit Belgrade, Minister Jovanovic said: When we agree on the date of that visit.

The withdrawal of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] from Krajina must be prevented with positive steps by all those interested in seeing the return of peace and a political solution acceptable to all sides.

Further From Jovanovic

AU2402174295 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1530 GMT 24 Feb 95

[Report by Mirjana Protic on news conference by Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in the Federal Assembly in Belgrade on 24 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Protic] One of the journalists' questions referred to a possibility

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of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] recognizing Croatia. Here is what Federal Foreign Minister Jovanovic said:

[Jovanovic] We have a clear and principled stand on these issues. This stand firmly rests on the legal stand adopted by the international community with regard to these issues at the time of the International Conference on Yugoslavia, on the Vance plan, which is also an international document of the first class, as well as on realism that (?absolutely) shows that everything that is done should be done in accordance with the facts and logic. Therefore, we did not even find it necessary to particularly start that issue, nor was this issue as such topical. On the other hand, we have been and are saying everywhere that the principle of equality, the equal treatment and respect of all participants in any settlement, in this specific case Yugoslavia, is something that can no longer be bypassed, something that must be accepted if progress is really wanted in the settlement of some problems.

[Protic] Vladislav Jovanovic denied journalists' claims that a Milosevic-Tudjman-Izetbegovic meeting has been convened.

[Jovanovic] I do not know who has been announcing the meeting. There is obviously a list of wishes, but we are not thinking about this at this moment, nor does anything like a decision on that exist.

[Protic] Federal Minister Jovanovic declared totally unfounded the journalists' claims that sealed [kovertiran] statements on the recognition of Croatia nevertheless exist. In response to the question on when Croatian Foreign Minister Granic will visit Belgrade, Minister Jovanovic said: When we agree on the date of that visit.

There is no information on a meeting between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Croatian president that has been scheduled for the end of March.

Journalists were interested in the details of the talks that Serbian President Milosevic held with Russian Minister Kozyrev, as well as the details of the talks with the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Germany.

[Jovanovic] In all these meetings, which were informal, and, after all, represent a continuation of a practice, since we meet often, we discussed the current situation in solving the Yugoslav crisis and concluded that some elements of a worrying, negative trend are massing, and that efforts aimed at revitalizing and making more dynamic the peace process should be stepped up against that trend.

In this sense we had a useful, fruitful exchange of opinions on various possibilities and ideas. All these possibilities and ideas are in the initial stage. There will be more contacts, as has been the case so far. So, there is nothing concluded at this time. [passage omitted]

[Protic] Yugoslav Minister Jovanovic rejected the possibility of Yugoslavia taking part in the war conflicts.

[Jovanovic] I said that in the event of an attack on Yugoslavia, we will defend ourselves with all means, and, as for the other issue, that Krajina itself is strong enough not only to repel attacks but also to deter the possible attackers from repeating attacks.

On the other hand, in case there was an unexpected course of events, a very unfavorable course of events, we would take a stand on that situation subsequently, in an adequate way.

Jovnovic: Prevlaka Not Same as Krajina

AU2702155095 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Feb 95

[Report by Vladimir Nikolic]

[FBIS Translated Text] During a break in the session of the Chamber of Citizens of the Assembly of Yugoslavia, Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic answered several questions posed by assembly correspondents concerning foreign affairs. Vladimir Nikolic reports:

[Nikolic] One of the questions posed to Minister Jovanovic was what should be done considering the present tensions caused by the announced cancellation of UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Force] mandate by Croatia.

[Jovanovic] Return to legality, observe the decision of the Security Council on the dispatch of peace forces, observe the Vance plan, which is a binding document for several sides, a document that none of the sides can endanger with unilateral moves as that side would then endanger peace and security of all citizens who live there. This has in fact just happened with the decision of the Croatian side. Croatia should now either make this decision null and void or formally revoke it.

[Nikolic] Regarding reports that NATO would take part in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR in order to help it, Minister Jovanovic said:

[Jovanovic] I would prefer to think that this would not happen. Therefore, these exercises of practicing the withdrawal has more of the general staff-academic than practical significance. Even if this did take place, this still does not mean that the U.S. soldiers would indeed come there. As far as I can see, this is more a question of the administration and Congress trying to outplay each other. We will see how this ends.

[Nikolic] Replying to the question of what will happen if UNPROFOR withdraws from the Prevlaka peninsula as well, Minister Jovanovic said:

[Jovanovic] Prevlaka is not the same as Krajina because it was placed under UNPROFOR protection on the basis of a special decision by the UN Security Council. This

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decision is based on the well-known statement, Cosic-(?Tudjman). Therefore, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Prevlaka should not automatically be linked to the possible withdrawal from Krajina.

On the other hand, this is an issue that encroaches very sensitive relations and it would not be good for any side to play with it irresponsibly and casually. Therefore, I do not believe that the Croatian side will play with this fire. It played with it three or four years ago and we had a hot showdown in that region. I believe this will not be repeated.

Statistics Show Further Deterioration of Economy

AU2702170295 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 95 p 9

[Article by B. Jager: "Devaluation on a Daily Basis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Owing to new economic policy measures the inflation rate in the economy has remained under the expected level, although it has not been eliminated. A high price has been paid for it through the decrease in industrial production, underutilization of facilities, a decrease in employment, and a decline in exports. Since only 2 percent of the companies polled expect that their prices will drop in the next three months, it is quite certain that the government's recommendation to return the prices to the July level will not be fulfilled. It is stated in the February issue of the KONJUNKTURNI BAROMETAR, the journal issued by the Institute of Economics, that the general price level was 23 percent higher in January than in July 1994, so that it is unrealistic to expect that the inflation rate could be reduced by that much.

The economy is also approaching a new explosion of costs. In the next three months as many as 43 percent of companies expect production costs to remain on the rise. It has to be admitted that a decline in wages and salaries was registered in January, but it amounts only to an average of 264 dinars. This means that wages and salaries still exceed the November level, which should have been achieved, by 15 dinars. Apart from that, the economy is further exposed to an explosion of costs through foreign trade. There is practically a continuing devaluation of the dinar every day. By applying multiple exchange rates we have reached a situation in which at least five various "prices" are valid for the domestic currency. This situation increasingly affects the balance of payments, because the prices for imports instead of those for exports rise. The economic policy has decided for the first time not to stimulate exports to a sufficient extent, in other words it has aimed its measures predominantly at the restriction of imports. A consequence is that as many as 75 percent of all the companies polled are not planning to export in the next three months, which is an obvious proof that the measures taken with the aim to encourage exports and to increase the hard-currency income are ineffective.

A 23.8 percent decline in industrial production in January proves that the economic situation is deteriorating much more quickly than expected. This is a direct consequence of the restrictive monetary policy that shows that more or less all the effects reached by stable prices in 1994 have already been exhausted. In order to stop these long-term tendencies, more serious measures should be taken in order to restructure the economy. We should not be deceived by the forthcoming seasonal recovery of production in February and March, first of all because it cannot be predicted yet to what extent the new explosion of costs will aggravate the recession in economic activity.

A rise in prices for imports and restrictions on imports are considered to be the biggest problems facing the production process. A new difficulty is that companies begin to feel the lack of domestic raw materials and the already traditional lack of loans. This is a result of a sharp drop in the manufacturing of production materials, recorded in the last two months. It has to be admitted that manufacturers of production materials do not expect prices to rise in the coming months, but they predict that production costs will rise considerably, so that it will remain uncertain until the very last moment whether the expected increase in their production will be achieved, which should reduce the shortage of domestic raw materials in other economic sectors.

KONJUNKTURNI BAROMETAR also registers an increase in debts between companies, which is a consequence of insolvency, which has been present in banks and companies practically since October. Around 30 percent of the companies polled consider that business activities have become more risky; there is slight optimism that the economy might work better and under more stable conditions in the coming months, but it does not arise from the economy itself; it rather relies on the expectation of companies that the economic policy and the state can still do something. They probably hope that the economic sanctions will be lifted in 1995.

Kontic, De Lapresle Meet; Sanction Lift Urged

AU2702203795 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic received the current commander of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] for the previous Yugoslavia, General Bertrand de Lapresle, and his successor French Gen. Bernard Janvier. They jointly concluded that the regular changeover of UNPROFOR commanders is being carried out at a delicate moment in the Yugoslav crisis, and that Croatia's request for the withdrawal of the peace force could lead to the escalation of the war in the broader region.

Gen. de Lapresle, whose mandate as UNPROFOR commander ends on 1 March, said that, during his one year term of commanding the peace forces, he became convinced that the sanctions of the international community

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inflicted most harm on the population. According to him, the embargo could be said to be more of a generator of violence than peace.

Federal Prime Minister Kontic thanked Gen. de Lapresle for the successful overseeing of a complex peace operation and for commanding diverse military forces made up of members of 36 countries. Kontic emphasized UNPROFOR's significant contribution to preserving peace and creating increasingly better conditions for the realization of the peace process.

Yugoslavia welcomes the decision of the UN secretary general that French Gen. Janvier should take over command of the peace forces, especially in view of the fact that France has the largest number of soldiers and officers in UNPROFOR, more than 4,000, Kontic said.

On 21 February, it was three years since the Security Council adopted a decision to start a UN peace operation in the previous Yugoslavia. The former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] was the initiator for the arrival of UNPROFOR. It has accepted the Vance plan and made a significant contribution to its realization. The Yugoslav prime minister stressed that Yugoslavia has take on and fulfilled many obligations from the Vance plan even though the peace operations are not carried out on its territory.

In very difficult economic conditions caused by the introduction of the sanctions, the Federal Government has also offered significant material and logistical support to the UN peace mission, Prime Minister Kontic said.

It was jointly concluded that the belief that ultimatums, sanctions, and threats cannot achieve peace and freedom for the people in this region is increasingly gaining in prominence in the world organization. With its involvement and contributions so far, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has demonstrated that it unreservedly favors a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, the Yugoslav prime minister said. Unfortunately, this endeavor and practical moves have not resulted in the lifting of the sanctions, which, as he said, would be one of the most important factors in speeding up the peace process.

Serbia

Milosevic Recognition of Croatia, B-H Denied

LD2602153095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1449 GMT 26 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Feb. 26 (TANJUG)—The vice-president of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Goran Percevic, has denied reports by some domestic papers that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has 'already promised that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia would soon be recognized and that only a convenient moment for revealing this was awaited.'

In an interview to the daily POBJEDA, published in Podgorica, capital of Montenegro, Percevic said that in question were 'speculations by tabloids.' SPS, headed by Milosevic, participates in the Serbian and Yugoslav Governments. Percevic said that the SPS position on the recognition of the former Yugoslav republic was clear. He recalled that the premature recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992 was the reason for the escalation of the fighting between the republic's three warring nations.

Local Serbs proclaimed their own states—the Srpska republic and the republic of Serb Krajina—in reaction to the forceful secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia from the former Yugoslav Federation.

Percevic said that the 'first and unavoidable step' in resolving the crisis in the territory of the former federation was the lifting of the international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (made up of Serbia and Montenegro). Percevic said that Yugoslavia would base its position 'on the breakaway republics on its sovereignty and the independence of its policy.'

He said the recognition of 'some republics,' as a condition for lifting the sanctions on Yugoslavia, was unacceptable because it would 'represent the direct extension of the list of conditions set in the Security Council resolutions which formally imposed the sanctions.'

The United Nations Security Council in May 1992 imposed comprehensive and binding sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia due to its alleged involvement in the civil war between the local Serbs, Croats and Muslims in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sanctions were partially suspended in October 1994 after Belgrade supported the international 'Contact Group' peace plan for Bosnia.

Percevic said that Yugoslavia had fulfilled all the conditions for the lifting of the sanctions and that the resolution of the problems referring to the territories of the former Yugoslav Republics Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina should be sought in direct talks between the warring sides and on the basis of their equal treatment.

Percevic said that this sequence of moves should be implemented and that the recognition of the former members of the federation could not contribute to the resolution of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Montenegro

Religious Affairs Minister Meets Islamic Leaders

LD2702180395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1514 GMT 27 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Podgorica, 27 Feb (TANJUG)—Slobodan Tomovic, Montenegro's minister of

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religious affairs, today received in Podgorica representatives of the Islamic religious community in Montenegro—Idriz Demirovic, president of the Council of Elders, and Hijadet Kalac, president of the Islamic community's assembly, the republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced.

The main topic of the talks was the new Islamic constitution in Montenegro and its possible implications for relations between religion and the state and between Islamic believers themselves. There was also discussion of the further improvement of relations between the state and religious authorities.

A statement by Religious Affairs Minister Dr. Tomovic on these talks says, among other things:

The present relations between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Council of Elders of the Islamic Community are correct. They reflect mutual understanding and mutual respect, with prospects for constant improvement.

I have pleasure in stating that the Islamic religious community in Montenegro over the past few years has made a significant contribution to reducing and neutralizing negative religious, national, and political tensions that have been transferred to Montenegro from war-affected areas.

With the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Islamic community in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] lost its religious headquarters and its Supreme Council of Elders, which used to be based in Sarajevo. The need thus arose for the Islamic community in the FRY to be organized in a new way to allow it to function better and be given more favorable international treatment. [sentence as heard].

To this end a new constitution of the Islamic religious community in Montenegro was formed and this was approved by the assembly of the Islamic community at its session. Article 48 of the constitution envisages the election of the most senior representative of the Islamic religious community in Montenegro to the post of Reis.

As minister for religious affairs, I expect the Islamic religious community in Montenegro, in applying this constitution, to respect to the greatest extent the existing state system in the FRY and Montenegro. All possible disagreements will be removed by timely contacts between the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the leaders of the Islamic community. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Albanians Fleeing Country Reduced by Half

AU2502214095 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 25 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a call by President Ibrahim Rugova to the citizens of Kosova, reports confirm that the number of Albanians who have fled Kosova via the Tivar-Bari crossing has been reduced by half.

It is thought that a positive influence in halting the defection of Kosovars has been played by institutions, political parties, and other Albanian associations which, along with anti-Serbian colonization activities, undertook actions to halt the emigration of Albanians from Kosova.

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